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Abstract
Kaminsky  and Schmukler  examine the short- and long-  liberalization  is followed  by more pronounced boom-
run effects of financial liberalization  on capital markets.  bust cycles in  the short run. But financial  liberalization
To do so, they  construct a  new comprehensive  leads to more stable markets  in the long run. Finally,  the
chronology of financial liberalization  in 28 developed  authors analyze  the sequencing  of liberalization  and
and emerging economies  since  1973. The authors  also  institutional  reforms to understand  the contrasting  short-
construct an  algorithm to identify booms  and busts in  and long-run  effects of liberalization.
stock market prices. The results indicate that financial
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financial  support.The  crises  of the  1990s  have  claimed  several  victims.  Banking  systems  in  many
countries  collapsed,  roaring  growing  economies  suddenly  faced  sharp  recessions,  and  the
booming  international  capital  flows  of the  mid  1990s  dwindled  to  a trickle.  This  is  not all.
Another important casualty of these crises has been the support for the liberalization of financial
systems.  In the aftermath of the Asian crisis,  many have argued  that globalization  has gone too
far,  leading  to  erratic  capital  markets  and causing  costly  crises.  This has  prompted  some  to
suggest a return  to the old order of financial  controls.  For example,  Stiglitz (1999)  clamors for
developing countries  to put some limits on capital  inflows  to moderate  "excessive"  boom-bust
patterns  in  financial  markets.'  Even controls  on  capital  outflows,  not  long  ago  dismissed  as
ineffective,  have been recommended  again.  Krugman (1998),  for example,  argues that capital
controls  might  help  in  managing,  at  least  temporarily,  an  otherwise  disorderly  retreat  of
investors.  The  debate  has reached  the general  public,  with  Soros  (2002)  and  Stiglitz  (2002)
broadly  criticizing  the  functioning  of the  international  financial  system.  With  many  more
economists joining  the  ranks  of those  supporting  intervention  in financial  markets,  long  gone
seem to be the days of an indiscriminate  advocacy of financial integration.2
Interestingly,  in  what seems  to be  a parallel  world, many  still praise  the advantages  of
liberalization.  It  is  claimed  that  financial  liberalization  helps  to  improve  the  functioning  of
financial  systems,  increasing  the  availability  of  funds  and  allowing  cross-country  risk
diversification.  For  example,  Obstfeld  (1998)  argues  that  international  capital  markets  can
channel  world savings  to their most productive  uses, irrespective  of location.  Stulz (1999)  and
Mishkin  (2001)  claim  that  financial  liberalization  promotes  transparency  and  accountability,
' These overreactions  in capital  markets  are often explained by information asymmetries.  With imperfect and costly
information,  investors may act as a herd and overreact  to shocks, withdrawing from countries at the smallest  signs of
problems, even when fundamentals  do not warrant it.  See, for example,  Calvo and Mendoza (2000).
See, for example, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) and Rodrik (1998).
1reducing  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  while  alleviating  liquidity  problems  in financial
markets.  They  argue,  moreover,  that  international  capital  markets  help  to  discipline
policymakers,  who might  be tempted  to exploit an otherwise  captive domestic  capital market.
Others  even claim that financial  liberalization  and the  financial development  it triggers tend to
greatly facilitate  economic  growth.3 As with the group  that favors more  repression, the  group
supporting deregulation  has also been growing in numbers.4
The  empirical  research,  so  far,  has  not  helped  to resolve  the  conflicting  views.  The
findings in the crisis literature  suggest that excessive booms and busts in financial markets are at
the core  of currency  crises and  that these  large cycles  are  triggered by financial  deregulation.5
On the contrary, the findings in the finance literature tend to support the claim that deregulation
is beneficial,  with liberalization  reducing the cost of capital.6 Perhaps,  the inability  to settle this
debate  is due to the fact that the various lines of empirical research focus either on the  short-run
or on the long-run effects of deregulation,  without  studying the possible time-varying  effects of
financial  liberalization.  Moreover,  the  existing  empirical  literature  has  not  provided  a
comprehensive  analysis  of the liberalization  process.  It  has  concentrated  alternatively  on  the
liberalization  of the  domestic  financial  sector,  the  capital  account,  or  the  stock  market,  even
when liberalization reforms have entailed the progressive opening of the three sectors.
The  goal  of this  paper  is,  first,  to provide  a better  understanding  of the  liberalization
process  and,  second,  to  explain both  the link  between  liberalization  and crises  as  well  as  the
relation between  deregulation and more stable financial markets.  To do so, we first assemble a
3The evidence  on the benefits  of financial  deregulation seems  to be quite  strong with, for  example,  output growth
rates  estimated to have increased about one percentage  point following liberalization  (as shown  in Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lundblad 2001).
4 See, for example,  King and  Levine (1993),  Jayaratne and  Strahan  (1996),  Rajan and  Zingales (1998),  and Levine
(2001).
5See, for example,  Corsetti, Roubini,  and  Pesenti  (1998),  Kamninsky  and Reinhart  (1999),  and McKinnon and  Pill
(1997).
2new,  more  comprehensive  database  on  financial  liberalization  for  28  countries  for  the  period
January  1973-June  1999.  By  itself,  this  is  an  important  contribution  because  this  database
improves over the existing ones in several respects.  (1) The new dataset looks at the experiences
of a wide  set of countries,  both developed  and developing.  (2)  It captures  various  aspects  of
liberalization,  namely the deregulation of the capital  account, the domestic  financial  sector, and
the stock  market.  (3) The  chronology  covers  an  extended  period in which several  regulatory
changes  occurred,  including  deregulations  and impositions  of new controls.  (4) The  new data
provide information on the degrees of liberalization.
We also construct an anatomy of stock market cycles by applying algorithms  designed to
identify business  cycles.  With this technique,  we study the duration and magnitude  of upturns
and downturns.  Since financial  cycles would be  spurious if markets were efficient,  we test the
null  hypothesis  of a  random  walk.'  We  then  study  whether  booms  and  busts  change  with
financial  liberalization.  We  finally  analyze  the  possibility that  financial  deregulation  triggers
forces  that  favor  changes  in institutions,  which  can ultimately  promote  financial  stability  and
growth.
The  rest  of the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  I  describes  the  new  data  on
financial  liberalization  and  examines  the  patterns  of deregulation.  Section  II  characterizes
booms  and  busts  in  the  different  regions.  Section  III  examines  whether  domestic  financial
liberalization  and capital controls can explain the changing  nature of financial cycles.  Section IV
relates financial liberalization to institutional reform.  Section V concludes.
6 See, for example, Henry (2000).
7  Some  empirical  evidence  in the  last two  decades  has  undermined  the belief in  efficient  markets.  Now  many
economists  believe that imperfections  in asset markets trigger bubbles  and protracted  and predictable  bull and bear
3I. The evolution of global financial liberalization
One  of the  most  prolific  areas  of empirical  research  in  international  economics  and
finance  has  been that of the  analysis  of the  effects  of controls  and  financial  liberalization  on
financial  markets,  investment,  and growth.  Surprisingly,  in spite of the great interest of several
disciplines  on the effects  of deregulation  of financial markets,  the information  on the evolution
of  financial  regulations  is  still  very  fragmented.  Below  is  a  brief  review  of  the  existing
measures.
Information  on capital  account  controls  is  mostly based on indicators  published  by the
International Monetary  Fund (IMF) in Exchange Arrangements and  Exchange Restrictions. 8 For
the  period  1975-1995,  this  publication  reports  a  single  indicator  classifying  only  two  capital
account regimes:  a "no  controls"  regime, which includes  episodes with full liberalization  of the
capital account, and a "controls"  regime, which includes both episodes  with minor restrictions  to
the  free  flow  of capital  as  well  as  episodes  with  outright  prohibition  of all  capital  account
transactions.  This indicator does not distinguish between controls on capital inflows and controls
on capital  outflows.  Only in  1996,  the  IMF  began to publish a more comprehensive  report on
capital account controls, which still does not capture the intensity of controls.9
Information  on regulations  of the  domestic  financial  sector  is  even  more  fragmented.
There is no institution compiling systematic cross-country information over time and researchers
have  relied  on  varied  sources.  One  of them  is  Williamson  and  Mahar  (1998),  which  dates
liberalization  according to five distinct dimensions of financial liberalization:  existence  of credit
markets.  See  for example,  De  Long,  Shleifer,  Summers,  and  Waldmann  (1990),  Allen  and  Gorton  (1993),  and
Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993).
8 See Quinn and Inclan (1997) for an alternative measure.
9 The new indicators evaluate  restrictions  on  II  types of capital  account transactions:  (1)  capital market securities,
(2)  money  market  instruments,  (3)  collective  investment  securities,  (4)  derivatives  and  other  instruments,  (5)
commercial  credits,  (6)  financial  credits,  (7)  guarantees,  sureties,  and  financial  backup  facilities,  (8)  direct
investment,  (9) liquidation of direct investment, (10)  real estate transactions, and (I 1)  personal capital movements.
4controls, controls on interest rates, entry barriers to the banking industry, government  regulation
of the banking sector, and importance of government-owned  banks in the financial system.  Most
researchers  construct  their own  liberalization  chronology.  For  example,  Demirguc-Kunt  and
Detragiache (1999) date liberalization  for 53 countries since  1980.  In that study, liberalization of
the domestic financial  sector is interpreted as liberalization of domestic interest rates.
Information  on the liberalization of domestic stock markets  is also still quite partial.  The
International  Financial  Corporation  (IFC) provides  this information just for emerging  markets.
Again,  this  index  (as  the  IMF  index  for  the  capital  account)  only  captures  two  regimes:  a
"liberalization"  regime  and a "restricted"  regime.  The liberalization dates are determined based
on whether foreigners  are allowed to purchase  shares of listed companies  in the domestic stock
exchange and whether there is free repatriation of capital and remittance of dividends and capital
gains.  Others,  such as  Bekaert  and Harvey  (2000),  construct  their own chronologies  of stock
market  liberalization  to  date  liberalization  episodes  for  emerging  markets,  using  information
compiled by the  IFC  and the establishment of new  investment vehicles  like country funds  and
depositary receipts.'0
The  existing  chronologies  share  some  limitations.  One  limitation  is  that  they  do  not
distinguish between different intensities  of liberalization/repression.  Since deregulation tends to
change slowly, valuable information is lost when the indicators  only try to assess whether or not
the liberalization  has occurred."  Another limitation  is that most chronologies  analyze  financial
liberalization  episodes as if they were permanent.  Still, many countries have undergone  several
'°  There  is  a  very  large  related  literature  that  studies  the  extent  of financial  and  economic  integration  from
observable economic  variables, not from government regulations.
"  For  example,  Chile  introduces  restrictions  on  capital  inflows  at  the  beginning  of the  1990s.  Controls  are
reinforced  in the  mid-1990s in  the midst of the  capital inflow episode.  In  1998,  under the threat of a contagious
speculative attack  against the Chilean peso, controls are eliminated.  Similarly,  domestic  financial  deregulation may
take several  years  to be  complete.  For example,  the deregulation  of the domestic  banking  sector  in  Colombia is
initiated in  August 1974.  Only in the 1980s, credit controls are finally eliminated.
5liberalization  reversals, particularly  following currency  crises.'2 Naturally, these limitations call
for a more comprehensive analysis of the various aspects of financial controls.
A. New measures of financial liberalization
The new measures of financial  liberalization  introduced in this paper try to overcome part
of the  shortcomings of previous  chronologies  discussed  above.  Thus, our database  captures  to
some degree the intensity of financial  liberalization  episodes  as well as episodes of liberalization
reversals.  Our chronology  also tries to address. some of the limitations of the empirical research
on  the  effects  of financial  liberalization.  First,  most  of the  empirical  research  focuses  on
emerging markets,  perhaps because  most concerns are associated  with liberalization episodes  in
developing  countries,  with  even  the  most  averse  critics  of capital  account  liberalization  still
supporting  the  financial  deregulation  of developed  markets.  A  comprehensive  picture  of the
effects of financial  liberalization requires the analysis of deregulation episodes in both developed
and developing countries,  which the new database  covers.  Second, most of the previous  studies
focus  on  the  elimination  of controls  on  just one  particular  financial  sector,  be  it  the  capital
account,  the domestic  financial sector, and the  stock market.  This focus on the opening of just
one  financial  market may result in a biased picture,  since controls  in one sector can also  affect
the behavior of other parts of the financial  system, which may or may not be directly under any
type of restrictions.'3 The new chronology deals with the regulations  in three sectors.
12 For example, Argentina  implements  a broad  liberalization of financial  markets in  1977,  which is later  reversed  in
1982.  Again,  in  the  late  1980s,  a  new wave  of financial  liberalization  affects the  domestic  ftnancial  sector,  the
capital  account,  and the  stock market.  This time around the liberalization  attempt is  longer lasting.  Still,  again  in
2001,  in the  midst of Argentina's  crisis,  the  government  reintroduces  controls on interest rates  and restrictions  on
capital account transactions.
13 This  problem  may  be  particularly  important  because  the  complete  deregulation  of  financial  systems  is  not
accomplished  in just one round,  and the  time span between  the deregulation  of one market  and the  elimination of
controls  across  the  board  takes,  in  most  cases,  several  years.  For  example,  the  data  show  that,  in  the  1970s,
domestic  financial  repression  is  widespread  not only  in  emerging  markets,  but also  in several  developed  financial
markets.  Governments  start lifting  the various restrictions  gradually.  In many cases, the liberalization  reform starts
in the banking sector  with the deregulation  of domestic  interest rates.  The elimination  of interest rate  controls not
6The  new  database  includes  28  countries  for  the  period  1973-1999.14  We  classify  the
sample into four (mostly regional) country  groupings: the  G-7 countries,  which are comprised of
Canada,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Japan,  United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States;  the  Asian
region, which includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, (South) Korea, Taiwan,
and Thailand; the  European group, which excludes  those countries that are part of the G-7, and
includes  Denmark,  Finland,  Ireland,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  and  Sweden;  and  the  Latin
American  sample,  which  consists  of the  largest  economies  in  the  region,  Argentina,  Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
To  capture  the  liberalization  of the  capital  account,  we  evaluate  the  regulations  on
offshore  borrowing  by  domestic  financial  institutions,  offshore  borrowing  by  non-financial
corporations,  multiple  exchange  rate  markets,  and controls  on capital  outflows.  The  first two
indicators reflect restrictions on capital inflows.  Restrictions  on capital  inflows can  take various
forms,  with  the  most  extreme  restriction  being  an  outright  prohibition  to  borrow  overseas.
Milder  controls  include  restrictions  of minimum maturity  on  capital  inflows  and  non-interest
reserve requirements on foreign borrowing.
To  measure  the  liberalization  of  the  domestic  financial  system,  we  analyze  the
regulations  on  deposit  interest  rates,  lending  interest  rates,  allocation  of credit,  and  foreign-
currency deposits.  As additional  information,  we also collect data on reserve requirements.  To
set  the  liberalization  dates,  we  focus  mainly  on  the  first  two variables,  the  price  indicators.
However,  we complement that information with the regulations  on the last three variables, those
on quantities, to have a better picture of the degree of repression of the domestic financial sector.
only  affects  the market  for bank loans  and  deposits,  but also attracts  international  capital flows  (when these  flows
are not strictly prohibited).  Also, the stock market flourishes as the extent of credit rationi ng diminished.
14  In fact,  since Hong Kong and Taiwan are part of China, the database has fewer countries.  Still, for simplicity  we
refer to those economies as countries.
7Finally, to track the liberalization of stock markets, we study the evolution of regulations  on the
acquisition  of shares  in the  domestic  stock  market  by  foreigners,  repatriation  of capital,  and
repatriation of interest and dividends.
For each  sector,  the  chronology  identifies  three  regimes:  "fully  liberalized,"  "partially
liberalized,"  and  "repressed."  The  criteria  used to determine  whether  the capital  account,  the
domestic  financial sector, and the stock market are fully or partially  liberalized, or repressed,  are
described  in detail  in Appendix  Table  1.  We  established  these criteria  after collecting  all the
regulations  and  carefully  studying  the  range  of restrictions  adopted  throughout  countries  and
years.  We  believe  that these  criteria  characterize  well the  degrees  of financial  liberalization.
The chronology  of restrictions compiled for each country and sector along with the complete list
of references  used to construct  it are described  in a separate  set of tables,  Annex Tables  1 and
2.15
Table  I reports  the dates of partial and full financial  liberalization for all the countries  in
the sample.  The first three columns  of dates display the liberalization  of the capital account,  the
domestic  financial sector, and the stock market.  The last two columns report dates of partial and
full liberalization  taking into account the three sectors  analyzed.  A country is considered  to be
fully  liberalized  when  at  least  two  sectors  are  fully  liberalized  and  the  third  one  is  partially
liberalized.  A country is classified as partially liberalized when at least two sectors are partially
liberalized.
15 The  sources  of information  include  the  IMF  publications  Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions and
Recent  Economic Developments  (country  reports),  the  IFC  publication  Emerging Markets  Database, and  the
Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD)  publication  Economic Surveys.  We  also  use
8B. Pace and dynamics-of liberalization
Figures  1-3  and  Table 2  summarize  the information  in Table  1 by  displaying the time-
series  and  cross-sectional  variation  of liberalization.  Figure  I  plots  the  index  of financial
liberalization in emerging and developed markets.  This index jointly evaluates the liberalization
of the  capital  account,  the domestic  financial  sector, and the  stock  market.  It can take values
between one and three, with  one indicating fully liberalized and three indicating fully repressed
financial  systems.  As expected, developed  financial markets are on average less regulated.  The
index  for  developed  markets  averages  1.7  over  the  sample,  while  for  emerging  markets,  it
averages  2.3.  Interestingly,  across all regions  there is  a gradual  lifting of restrictions,  with the
index of liberalization  declining from an initial value  of 2.5  for developed markets  and 2.9  for
emerging  economies to one  and  1.2,  respectively,  toward the end of the sample.  Still, there is
also  a  regional  pattern  in  the  dynamics  of  financial  liberalization,  with  emerging  markets
suffering  liberalization  reversals  in  the  early  1980s,  following  the debt crisis.  In contrast,  the
pace of liberalization in developed markets, while also gradual, is uninterrupted.
Figures  2  and  3 examine  separately  the  sequencing  of  liberalization  of the  capital
account,  the  domestic  financial  sector,  and  the  stock  market.  Figure  2  shows  the  index  of
liberalization  for  each  sector  for both  emerging  and  developed  markets.  Stock  markets  in
developed countries are liberalized earlier,  with the index for this sector oscillating around  1.5 in
the early 1  970s.  In contrast, both the domestic  financial sector and the capital account tend to be
severely repressed  until the early  1980s.  In the early  1970s, the indexes for both sectors are  on
average  above  2.5.  Financial  markets  across  the  board  are  heavily  repressed  in  developing
countries  in the early 1970s.  But in the mid and late 1970s, many emerging economies  liberalize
various reports by  the  Economist's  Intelligence  Unit, the World Bank,  annual reports of central  banks,  as  well as
research  papers with chronologies on financial  market restrictions.
9the  domestic  sector and the  capital  account.  The  liberalization  reform is short-lived.  Controls
are  re-imposed  in  the aftermath  of the  1982  debt crisis.  Overall,  restrictions  in stock markets
remain  in  place  until  the  late  1980s  when  a  liberalization  wave  occurs  in  Asia  and  Latin
America.
While  Figure  2 provides  information  on the average  level  of restrictions  in the various
financial  markets  in  the  two  regions,  it  may  still  mask  individual  country  experiences.  For
example,  a  medium value  of the  index  in one  region  may reflect that all  the countries  in that
region  are partially liberalized,  or that some countries are fully liberalized  while  the rest of the
countries  are completely  repressed.  Figure 3 presents another  perspective of the sequencing  of
liberalization  across  countries.  This  figure  reports  the  proportion  of countries  with  (at least)
partial  liberalization of the capital  account,  the  domestic  financial sector, and the stock  market,
again examined  separately  for emerging markets and  developed  markets.  By the early  1970s,
about  80  percent of stock markets  in developed  markets are already  liberalized.  In  developed
markets,  the  liberalization  of the  domestic  financial  sector  also  predates  the  opening  of the
capital  account,  with about  all  countries  liberalizing,  at  least  partially,  the  domestic  financial
sector  by the mid  1980s.  It is only in  the late  1980s and  the beginning  of the  1990s,  in part
driven  by the movement  toward  the  formation  of the  European  Monetary  Union,  that capital
account liberalization reaches all developed markets.
Liberalization follows  a different path in  emerging markets.  Only a small proportion of
countries implement reforms before the early  1970s.  This proportion increases  in the late 1970s
and then again in the mid and late  1980s.  By early  1990s, all the sectors of the financial system
are finally liberalized.  There  are two episodes of financial  liberalization.  The first one is in the
late  1970s.  In this episode,  all the  action centers in the domestic sector and the capital  account,
10with the stock market continuing  to be out of the reach  for foreign investors.  This liberalization
episode  ends  following  the debt crisis in  1982.  The second  wave  of liberalization  starts  in the
late  1980s.  This time around, basically both the domestic  sector and the stock market are jointly
deregulated,  predating capital account liberalization  that only starts in the early 1  990s.
Table 2 examines  even further the sequencing of liberalization by analyzing the strategies
and duration of liberalizations  in Asia, Europe,  G-7 countries,  and Latin America.  The top two
panels  show  the proportion  of episodes  in  which  the  capital  account,  the  domestic  financial
sector,  or the stock  market  is  liberalized  first.  The  top  panel  focuses  on partial  liberalization
episodes,  the panel below examines  full liberalization  episodes.  The bottom two panels display
the duration of liberalization  episodes;  they report the number of months  from the time the first
market  is  deregulated  until  liberalization  is  implemented  in  all  markets.  The  top  two  panels
reveal  that  the  paths  toward  financial  reform  differ  across  regions.  Basically  all  the  G-7
countries  deregulate  the  stock market  first.  European  countries  implement  a somewhat  mixed
strategy toward deregulation,  with 25 percent of the countries  liberalizing the domestic financial
sector first and basically all the rest deregulating the stock market first.  On the other hand, Latin
American  countries  overwhelmingly  adopt  liberalization  of the  domestic  financial  sector  first,
while  Asian countries  follow a mixed  strategy,  with some countries  opting for deregulating  the
domestic  sector  first  and  some  others  focusing  on  the  stock  market  first.  Capital  account
liberalization  in all Asian countries is mostly introduced at a latter stage.
The  bottom panels  reveal  that liberalization  reforms take  a long time  to be  completed.
On average,  66 months elapse  from the time the  first market  is liberalized  until all markets  are
deregulated.  Interestingly,  the  time  to  completion  of the liberalization  reform  is  far longer  in
Asia  than  in Latin  America.  Finally,  liberalization  episodes  that  are  first  implemented  in  the
11stock  market  are  the  ones  that  become  completed  the  fastest.  The  variety  of experiences  in
financial reforms  indicates that it is important to examine not just the responses to liberalization
in  one  particular  financial  market,  but  that  it  is  important  to  examine  the  effects  of the
sequencing of the deregulation reform.
II. Financial cycles
As discussed above,  to understand  better the conflicting stylized evidence  on the effects
of financial  liberalization,  it  is  useful  to  study  the  short-  and  long-run  response  of financial
markets  to  deregulation.  This  section  sets  the  groundwork  to  reconcile  the  evidence  by
constructing an anatomy of booms and busts (crashes) in stock markets.
A. Methodology  for identifying financial cycles
There  is a long tradition  in macroeconomics  in analyzing economic fluctuations in terms
of business-cycle  phases.  Economists  have examined the behavior of output in expansions  and
recessions,  with  particular  attention  to  asymmetries  in  the  two  phases  and  to  the  possible
changing  nature  of those  fluctuations.  For  the  United  States,  there  is  also  an  "official"
classification of the  cycle in expansions  and contractions.  No similar interest has  flourished in
characterizing  boom-bust  cycles  in  financial  markets.  Most  studies  in  financial  markets  are
focused on examining the relation between dividends, interest rates,  and stock prices to evaluate
whether  markets  are  efficient.  Other  papers  analyze  the  time-varying  volatility  in  financial
markets using ARCH-GARCH  models.  A third line of research looks at the domestic and global
factors that influence  prices. 1 6 In contrast,  there seem to be no studies on the behavior of stock
prices over financial cycles.  This lack of evidence on the  amplitude and duration of booms and
busts seems particularly notable  in light of the evidence that links booms  and busts in credit and
asset prices with financial crises.
12Perhaps, the lack of interest in booms and busts in stock prices steams from the idea that
in  efficient  markets  prices  should  follow  random  walk  processes.  In  this  case,  cycles  are
meaningless.  However,  as  Cecchetti,  Lam,  and  Mark  (1990)  show,  even  in efficient  markets
stock  prices  can  follow  mean-reverting  processes,  with  cycles  in the  stock  market  replicating
cycles in output.  Moreover,  cycles could be magnified by the increasing presence of institutional
investors, which tend to follow momentum-based  fads  (buying stocks that are past winners and
selling past losers), and by the presence of asymmetric information that leads to herding. 17
This paper concentrates  on the fluctuations of stock prices without  trying to quantify the
possible imperfections in financial markets.  The latter would not be an easy task due to the lack
of agreement  about  the  empirical  counterpart  to  any  definition  of equilibrium  stock  prices.
However,  while  we do not isolate  the effects  of fundamentals  and fads on financial  cycles, the
characterization  of stock  market  cycles  will  allow  us  to  start  understanding  the  behavior  of
financial  markets.  In  particular,  we  will  be  able  to  have  a  reading  on  whether  financial
liberalization has magnified the boom-bust cycles in financial markets.
The question now is how to identify historical cycles in stock prices.  There is no general
agreement  on the techniques to isolate  fluctuations  of variables  at business  cycles  frequencies.
The  first  approach  was  that  pioneered  by  researchers  at  the  National  Bureau  of Economic
Research  (NBER).18  The business cycle turning points were identified retrospectively  and on an
ongoing  basis  by  the  NBER.  Although  initially  these  turning  points  were  determined
judgmentally, the process  can be  well approximated  by a computer  algorithm developed by Bry
16  For a review see, for example,  Karolyi and Stulz (2002).
17  See, for example, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995).
'8 These researchers include Mitchell (1927), Mitchell and Burns (1938), and Burns and Mitchell  (1946).
13and Boschan (1971).  The NBER continues to use this methodology to identify what has become
to be known as the official business cycles dating in the United States.'9
In this paper,  we follow the  approach used by the NBER to construct  an algorithm  that
identifies  turning  points.  We  examine  stock  market  fluctuations  at  intermediate  frequencies,
since  financial  crises tend  to  follow boom-bust  cycles  in  financial  markets  of an  intermediate
duration, between  two and three  years.  According  to Bry and Boschan  (1971), the first step  in
the determination of cycles is the identification of cyclical turning points.  This technique and the
algorithms  that we apply look  for clearly defined swings in stock market prices  in each country.
We work with the same order of duration as business cycles, that is swings that are longer than
two years.  This  is the  only identifying  restriction.  We  are not imposing any other restrictions
such  as  minimum  amplitude  of cycles.  Essentially,  the  algorithm  isolates  local  minima  and
maxima  in a  time  series,  subject to  the constraint  that the  duration  of upturns  and  downturns
cannot be less than  12 months.20
The  cycles  we  identify  would  be  spurious  if stock  prices  followed  random  walk
processes.  To  show  that the  random walk does  not capture  the  basic properties  of the data on
stock  prices, we estimate  random  walks with drift  using parameters  calculated  from the actual
data.  For each  country, we  simulate a specific model  1,000 times.  Since  some of the series on
stock prices do not span the whole sample,  the number of months  for each country simulation  is
the same as the number of months in the actual data.  We then filter the simulated data with the
19  Other  researchers  of the  business  cycle  have  used  linear  filters  to  distinguish  between  the  trend  and  cyclical
components of time series.  However, there has not been any  agreement on whether variables are  trend stationary or
difference  stationary  or what  is the best  filter  to isolate  the  fluctuations  at different  frequencies.  As  examined  in
Stock  and  Watson  (1998),  these considerations  have  led  econometricians  to  find  methods  that  better  isolate  the
cyclical  component of economic time series with some researches  proposing using the Hodrik-Prescott  (1997)  filter
and others arguing in favor of the Baxter and King's (1995) band-pass  filter.
20  The algorithm  dates  contractions  and  expansions  using  each  country's  stock  price  series,  rather  than  the  de-
trended  series.  Therefore,  busts correspond to sequences  of absolute declines  in stock prices  rather than periods of
slow growth relative to the trend.
14algorithm and compare  the cycles  generated by random walk  processes  and  those generated by
the actual data.
B. Empirical regularities
Figure  4  reports  monthly  log  stock  price  indexes  for  the  28  countries  in  the  sample.
Stock prices are measured in  1993 U.S. dollars.21  (Appendix  Table 2 reports the indexes used as
well  as  their  sources.)  Figure  4  also  identifies  the  booms  and  crashes  obtained  using  the
algorithm  described  above.  The  algorithm  identifies  146  cycles.  The  shaded  areas  denote
expansions.  The series show well-defined swings with an average duration of about 44 months.
Table 3 examines the characteristics  of stock cycles  in the 28 countries in the sample and
compares  them to the behavior of the random walk simulations.  This table provides mean values
and tests  of whether  the  differences  between  the  actual and simulated  samples  are  statistically
significant.  Columns  2-3  and 5-6  report  the mean  amplitude  and duration of cycles  using the
actual  and  simulated data.  Columns 4  and 7 report  the  significance  level  of tests  of the  null
hypothesis  that  mean cycles  from  the  actual  and  simulated  data  are  equal.  The  depth of the
contraction  (height of the expansion)  is measured  as the  change between  the peak  (trough)  and
the following trough (peak), as a percent of the mid value of the peak and trough.  This measure
puts  the amplitude  of expansions  and contractions  on an equal  foot.  Finally,  the duration  of a
contraction  (expansion)  is  defined  as  the  number  of periods  between  a peak  (trough)  and the
following trough (peak).
According  to Table  3, booms across  all regions  oscillate  around 74 percent.  The typical
contraction  in stock markets  is  about  61  percent.  The  data  reveal that  contractions  tend  to  be
21  As it is common in  the international  finance and finance literature, we look at stock returns from the point of view
of investors  with  portfolios  comprising  assets  in  various  countries.  This  is  why,  we  study  returns  in  one
international  currency.  Alternatively,  we  could  have  focused  on  prices  in  domestic  currency  deflated  by  the
15short-lived relative to expansions.  The mean duration of contractions is around  18 months, while
the mean duration of expansions  is around 26 months and statistically different from the duration
of contractions  at all conventional  significance  levels.  From  the table,  it is clear that there are
significant differences between the amplitude  of booms and crashes in the actual  data relative to
the  one that is observed  under the null hypothesis  of a random walk.  The  amplitude of booms
for the actual data  is about  15  percent larger than the average  amplitude for the simulated data.
Similarly,  the average duration of booms for the actual data is about 20 percent  longer than the
average  duration for the  simulated  data.  Analogous  comparisons  can  be made  for contraction
episodes.  Again,  contractions  obtained from  the actual  data  are  significantly  more protracted
than those obtained from random walk processes.
To  provide  another  picture  of the  differences  between  the  actual  and  simulated  data,
Figure 5 reports the frequency distribution of the amplitude  and duration of booms and crashes.
The horizontal axis in each figure shows the size or duration of booms and crashes,  the vertical
axis  shows  the  frequencies  in  percent.  If stock  prices  followed a  random  walk process,  the
frequency distribution of the amplitude and duration of each phase of the cycle for the actual and
the  simulated  data  would  be  equal.  From  this  figure,  it  is  clear  that  there  are  significant
differences  in the  amplitude  and  duration  of booms  and  crashes  relative  to  what  one  would
expect if stock  prices  followed random  walks.  Booms  and  crashes  are  more  pronounced  and
protracted  than  those  generated  under  the  null  hypothesis  of a  random  walk.  Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests are used to evaluate  the null hypothesis of equal frequency distributions of the size
and duration of booms and crashes in the actual and random walk data.  As shown by the p-value
domestic  price  index.  Our results do  not change substantially  when  using prices  in domestic  currency  from those
discussed in the text.
16at the bottom of each panel, we reject the null hypothesis that stock prices  follow random  walk
processes.
Figure  6  examines  the  characteristics  of the typical  cycle  in the  four regions.  The  top
panel  reports  the mean amplitude  and duration of booms and crashes  in  Asia, Europe, the G-7
countries,  and Latin  America.  The  bottom  panel  plots the  typical  cycle  in each  region.  The
horizontal  axis in the figure records the number of months before and after the peak of the cycle.
The horizontal axis contains  26 months  for expansions  and  18  months for contractions.  These
are the durations of the two phases for the typical cycle  in our sample.  The vertical axis reports
the  value of the stock  index.  To obtain the  typical  cycle,  the value of the stock  index in each
cycle is normalized  to 100 at the peak.  Each line in this panel represents the average value of the
stock index during the 44 months around the peaks of the four regions.
Figure  6  shows  that  cycles  are  more  pronounced  in  Latin  America.  On  average,  the
amplitude  of cycles in  this region is about twice  as large as the amplitude of cycles  in the  G-7
countries.  As expected,  the most developed  countries, the G-7, have milder stock market cycles,
with the  Asian and the  other European  stock  market cycles  being of intermediate  magnitudes.
The Asian cycles are larger than the European ones.  In contrast to the disparities concerning  the
amplitude  of cycles,  the  duration of booms and busts  is similar across  regions, though  the ones
from developed countries tend to be longer, making the larger amplitudes  for emerging  markets
even more striking.
IlI. Stock  market cycles  and flnancial liberalization
To  examine  the claim  that  financial  liberalization  triggers more  protracted  and  deeper
booms  and  busts  in  asset  markets,  we  examine  the  characteristics  of financial  cycles  during
episodes  of financial  repression  and  liberalization.  Our  first  approach  is  in  the  event study
17tradition,  analyzing  the  behavior of stock markets  in  the aftermath  of liberalization  relative  to
their  functioning  in repression  times,  those years  before  deregulation  occurs.  To  examine the
conflicting  views  that  liberalization  triggers  financial  excesses  but  also  contributes  to  less
volatile  financial markets,  we compare the characteristics  of financial cycles in the short run and
long run following liberalization.  We then report regression results that control for other factors
and study the sequencing of the openings.  Those  results examine  whether liberalization creates
larger  cycles  when  the  first  market  opens  or  whether  each  consecutive  opening  triggers
substantial  increases  in  booms  and  crashes.  The  regressions  also  test  whether  financial
turbulences are just the product of liberalization  episodes that start with opening first the capital
account, the domestic sector, or the stock market.
A. Event studies
Figure 7 examines  the characteristics  of financial  cycles  around  the time of the overall
partial  liberalization  of  financial  markets,  that  is,  when  at  least  two  sectors  are  partially
liberalized.  We  classify financial  cycles  in three categories,  those that occur during  repression
times, those  that occur  in the short run after liberalization,  and those  that occur in the  long run
following liberalization.  The short run is defined  as the  four years after liberalization.  The long
run  includes  the  fifth  year  after  liberalization  and  the  years  thereafter,  conditional  on  the
deregulation  not being  reversed.22 The  top panel  in Figure  7 shows  the  average  amplitude  of
booms and crashes for all countries in our sample during repression times (the striped bars), the
short-run effects of liberalization  (the white bars),  and the  long-run effects  of liberalization  (the
gray bars).  It also reports  the characteristics  of cycles  separately for  emerging  and developed
u Since  the choice  of the  short-run  window is ad-hoc,  we  also  examined the robustness  of the results to  different
definitions of window size.  The results for three- and six-year windows are quite similar.
18markets  since the evidence from these  two groups of countries might differ.  The bottom panel
examines  whether the differences of amplitudes  across regimes are statistically significant.
The evidence  for the  28 countries  in the  sample  indicates  that the amplitude  of booms
substantially  increases in the immediate  aftermath of liberalization  (about 20 percent higher than
during repression  times).  But equity markets  stabilize  in the long run if liberalization persists,
with the  amplitude  of booms about 25  percent smaller than  in repression  times.  Similarly,  the
amplitude  of crashes  increases  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of liberalization  (about  15  percent
higher  than  during  repression  times),  but  declines  to  about  60  percent  of  its  size  during
repression  times  if liberalization  persists in  the long run.  As shown in the bottom panel,  these
differences are statistically significant at conventional  levels.
The  evidence  for  the  28  countries,  however,  obscures  important  differences  across
emerging and developed markets.  When examined  separately,  we note that the short-run effects
of liberalization in emerging markets are more striking, with booms and crashes in the immediate
aftermath of liberalization increasing by about 35 percent over their size during repression.  Still,
if liberalization persists,  financial cycles become  less pronounced,  with booms  about 30 percent
smaller than during repression times, and crashes about 90 percent of their size during repression
times.  On  the other hand,  the evidence  from developed  markets indicates  that if liberalization
triggers more volatile stock markets in the short run, booms and busts do not increase as much as
in the case of emerging markets.  Moreover,  on average,  crashes do not increase  relative to their
value  during  repression  times.  Still,  liberalization  seems  to  generate  more  stable  financial
markets  in the long run, with crashes  averaging only about 60 percent of their size in repression
times.
19B. Accounting for domestic and external shocks
While the evidence in Figure 7 suggests that financial  liberalization influences the size of
expansions  and contractions in financial markets,  stock price fluctuations  also reflect changes in
other market fundamentals.  For example,  stock prices  respond to expansions  and recessions  in
the domestic economy.  They also react to world economic  conditions.23 The omission of these
variables  may bias our results, especially since the timing of liberalization may not be fortuitous.
In  fact,  we have described  in Section  I that Latin  American  countries  reintroduce  controls on
domestic interest rates and credit and re-impose  controls on capital flows  following the hikes in
interest rates  in industrial countries  in the early  1980s.  Also, many emerging markets  liberalize
their  financial  markets  when  international  capital  flows  resume  in the  late  1980s.  Insofar  as
countries react to "bad times" by adopting capital controls and to "good times" by relaxing them,
there is the danger that we may ascribe the increase in the size of booms to liberalization and the
amplification of crashes to capital controls, when in fact it is the world market condition the one
fueling changes in stock prices.
To account  for these  factors,  the event study analysis is complemented  with regressions
that control for domestic  and world economic  conditions.  In particular,  we examine the role of
growth  in  domestic  and world economic  activity  and changes  in world real  interest rates.  We
estimate the following equation by least squares with heteroskedastic-consistent  standard errors,
amplitude, = Q'X  + pAd,  +Ad,  + Ad,"' +El,  (1)
where  amplitude,  is  the  amplitude  of expansion  (contraction)  i.  X,  is  a  matrix  of control
variables  that includes  the change  in world real  interest  rate, the world  output growth,  and the
domestic  output growth  during each  expansion (contraction).  d,'  is a dummy variable  equal to
20one if the  cycle  occurs  during "repression"  times,  and  zero  otherwise.  d,'  is  a "short-run"
dummy  variable  equal  to  one  if the  cycle  occurs  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of  financial
liberalization  (four-year  window),  and  zero  otherwise.  d"  is  a "long-run"  dummy  variable
equal  to  one  if the  cycle  occurs  after  four  years  have  elapsed  from  the  time  of  financial
liberalization,  and zero otherwise.  The world real  interest  rate is proxied with the  U.S.  federal
funds real interest rate, world output is the average of the industrial production indexes of the G-
3 countries, and domestic output is captured by the index of industrial production in the domestic
economy.  All data come from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.
The  results  from  this  estimation  are  shown  in  Table  4.  As  in  Figure  7, this  table
examines  the  effects  of overall  partial  financial  liberalization  (when at  least two  sectors  have
been  partially  liberalized).  As  expected,  fluctuations  in  the  world  interest  rate  affect  stock
market  cycles  as  does  output  growth,  with  a one  percentage  point  increase  in  the  world  real
interest  rate  leading  to  a  five  percentage  point  contraction  in  the  amplitude  of stock  market
expansions.  Similarly,  booms  and crashes  in stock markets  are  also explained by upturns  and
recessions  in  the  domestic  economy.  Even  after  accounting  for  these  other  determinants  of
fluctuations  in stock prices,  financial liberalization  still matters.  Financial liberalization triggers
larger cycles in the short run and stabilizes  financial markets in the long run.  Interestingly,  once
we control for the  state of the economy (domestic and foreign)  and for interest rate  fluctuations,
the short-run effects of financial  liberalization  become even more pronounced.  For example,  in
the  immediate  aftermath  of liberalization,  booms  increase  by  about  40  percent  in  emerging
markets  and by 55 percent in developed  markets relative to repression times.  Similarly,  crashes
23  For  example,  Calvo,  Leiderman,  and  Reinhart  (1993)  argue  that  decreases  in  U.S.  interest  rates  trigger  large
capital flows to emerging markets,  which in turn fuel increases  in asset prices.
21in emerging markets increase by 30 percent in the immediate aftermath of liberalization vis-a-vis
repression times.
Note  that the  results in Figure 7 and Table  4 suggest  two  tales about  the aftermath  of
liberalization  reforms.  While larger booms follow liberalization  in both emerging and developed
markets,  it  is only in emerging  markets  that  crashes  are  more  severe  following  liberalization.
The average  short-run experience  in emerging  markets seems  to support the  evidence  from the
crisis literature that concludes  that liberalization  leads to excessive  financial booms and crashes.
Liberalization  episodes  do  not  seem  to bring  (on  average)  this  short-run  pain  to  developed
markets;  larger booms are not followed by larger crashes,  suggesting that larger booms may just
reflect the reduction  in the cost of capital once deregulation  takes place, as the finance  literature
argues.24 Still, financial  liberalization brings more stable financial markets in both emerging and
developed market  economies in the long run.  In section IV, we examine  possible explanations
for the varied short-rn effects of liberalization  as well as for the long-run gains across countries.
C. Sequencing of liberalization
So  far we have  studied the liberalization  across  all markets.  Now we turn  to examine
whether  the  short-run  increase  in  boom-bust  arnplitudes  occurs  every  time  a  new  sector  is
deregulated and whether the sequencing  of the openings matters.  Table 5 examines  whether the
short-run  increase  in booms and busts occurs every time a new sector is deregulated.  We  limit
our  search  to the  deregulation  of the  first  two  sectors.  We  define  repression  times  as  those
episodes  in which all sectors  are closed.  The short-run  liberalization periods  are the  four years
after the opening of the first sector and the four years after the opening of the second sector.  The
24  As always averages  may hide exceptions,  Denmark,  Finland,  Norway,  and Sweden suffer financial  collapses  and
banking crises in the early 1990s following liberalization.
22long-run  liberalization  episode includes the fifth year after the opening of the  second sector and
the following years if the liberalization reform is not reversed.
We estimate the following regression,
amplitude,  a' XQ  + pAd[  + Ad,"`+ f32dX2 + Ad,r`2 +  , . (2)
The new variable  d  ' 2 is a dummy variable  equal  to one if the cycle  occurs in the  immediate
aftermath  of financial  liberalization  (four-year  window  after the first  sector is  deregulated  and
four-year window after the second sector is deregulated),  and zero otherwise.  d,r2 is a dummy
variable  equal  to  one if the cycle occurs  in the  four years  after  the deregulation  of the second
sector,  and zero otherwise.  d"2 is a dummy variable equal to one if the cycle occurs after four
years have elapsed  from the  time of the  liberalization of the second  sector,  and zero otherwise.
Thus, the average amplitude of booms (crashes)  in the aftermath  of the first opening  is captured
by  A,, while that of the second market opening is captured by  A +  82*.
While  the  evidence  on  short-  and  long-run  effects  of  financial  liberalization  is  not
reversed,  the  focus  on  the  first  and  second  openings  reveals  some  important  differences.
Interestingly,  the increase  in  the  amplitude  of booms  is similar  following the  first  and  second
opening,  but crashes  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of the  first  opening  are  smaller  than  those
observed during repression times.  The amplitude of crashes  in emerging markets only increases
following  the  opening of the second sector.  Again,  this evidence  is consistent  with the results
from the crisis  literature, which  finds that booms of credit persist for several years following the
deregulation of financial  markets with these booms  in turn fueling protracted bull markets.
Table  6 examines  the effects  on financial markets  of various types of sequencing  of the
deregulation process.  We estimate the following regression,
23amplitude, = a'X, + pAd,' + Aid,sJ 2 + A82d1  + f8 3 d,  + f4d  +Adl'r  + e,.  (3)
The variables  dfc  and  dsM  help to capture the possible differential  effect on booms and crashes
of opening respectively  the capital account and the stock market first.  These  dummy variables
are equal to one if the cycle occurs during the four years after that particular sector is liberalized,
and  zero  otherwise.  The  average  amplitude  of booms  (crashes)  in the  aftermath  of the  first
opening,  when  the  liberalization  reform  is  initiated  with  the  deregulation  of the  domestic
financial  sector,  is  captured  by  fA . If the liberalization  reform  starts with  the opening of the
capital account (stock market), the amplitude of booms or crashes in the four years after the first
opening is captured by  i, 1 + f 3 (8, + f4 ).
Our  results  indicate  that  the  ordering  of  liberalization  does  not  matter  in  general.
Opening  the  capital  account  or  the  stock  market  first  does  not  have  a  different  effect  than
opening the domestic financial  sector first.  But one exception exists; crashes seem to be larger in
emerging markets if the capital account opens up first.  This might provide some mild support to
the usual claim that the capital account should be opened last.
In sum,  our results suggest  that we gain  from examining the effects  of deregulation  of
different sectors.  In particular, we find that crashes become more pronounced not at the onset of
the  liberalization  reform  but  after  some  years  have  elapsed.  Interestingly,  the  sequencing  of
financial  liberalization does  not seem to matter when evaluating  the effects  on financial  cycles.
Finally,  as  also  shown  in  the  previous  section,  the  experiences  of developed  and  emerging
markets look different in the aftermath of financial liberalization.  We analyze these differences
next.
24IV. Financial liberalization and institutional reform
Our findings  necessarily provoke  several questions.  What is the essential  ingredient for
more  stable  financial  markets  in  the  long  run?  Is  it just  financial  liberalization?  Or,  does
liberalization trigger some other changes that in turn deliver more stable  financial markets in the
long  run?  Can  we  explain  the  differences  in  the  aftermath  of financial  liberalization  in
developed  and  emerging  markets?  And,  is  it  possible  to  avoid the  short-run  pain  following
liberalization?
These questions have generated an intense  debate on the sequencing of liberalization  and
institutional  reform.25 Many  have  argued  that  it  is  very  risky  to  open up  financial  systems.
During  financial  repression,  banks tend  to have poor balance  sheets.26 Protected  from  outside
competition,  badly  regulated,  and  badly  supervised  banks  do  not  have  the  pressure  to  run
efficiently.  Liberalization  in this scenario unveils a new problem,  as  protected  domestic banks
suddenly get access to new sources of funding, triggering protracted financial booms.  Moreover,
financial  liberalization  brings  competition  and  lowers  bank  profits,  eroding  banks'  franchise
values and lowering their incentive  for making good loans.  Naturally, this worsens problems  of
moral hazard.27  Based on these views, a standard recommendation  on sequencing is to first clean
up  domestic  financial  institutions  and  change  government  institutions,  then  deregulate  the
industry and open up the capital account.
This  discussion  about  sequencing  may be  irrelevant if the timing  is  such that  reforms
never predate  liberalization, with institutional  changes  happening mostly as a result of fiancial
25  Note  that the sequencing  mentioned  here  discusses the  optimal  order between  financial  liberalization  and  other
financial  sector  reforms.  While  the  sequencing  mentioned  in  the  previous  section  deals  with  the  order  of
liberalization  of the stock market, the domestic financial  sector, and the capital account.
26 This is shown, for example,  in Rojas-Suarez and Weisbro d (1994).
25deregulation.  To  shed  new  light on  this sequencing  debate,  we  collect  data  on  the quality of
institutions as  well  as  data  on the laws  governing  the proper  functioning  of financial  systems.
Then,  we compare the timing of financial  liberalization  and  institutional  reforms.  The data on
the  quality  of institutions  is  captured  by  the  index of law  and  order.28 To  better  assess  the
functioning  of the  financial  system,  we  use  information  on the  existence  and  enforcement  of
insider trading  laws, constructed  by Bhattacharya  and Daouk (2002).  Appendix  Table 3 reports
the time of improvement  in the law  and order  index,  the time when the  insider trading law  is
passed,  and  the  time  when  insider  trading  starts  to  be  prosecuted.  We  characterize  as  an
improvement in the quality of government institutions when the index of law and order increases
by one unit and this change is maintained for at least two years.
The  top  panel  in Table  7 examines  the  sequencing  of liberalization  and  reform  in our
sample of 28 countries.  It shows the probabilities that financial  liberalization occurs conditional
on  reforms  having  already  been  implemented.  In  particular,  we  look  at whether  reforms  to
institutions occur prior to the partial or full liberalization of the financial  sector.  If governments
clean  up  financial  institutions  and improve  the  quality  of institutions  prior to deregulating  the
financial  sector, one would expect this probability to be close to one.
The  evidence  for  emerging  and developed  markets  displayed  in  Table  7  suggests  that
reforms to institutions occur mostly after liberalization  is implemented.  For example,  in the case
of emerging  markets, in only 18 percent of the cases, law and order improves prior to the partial
liberalization of financial  markets.  Also,  while in 62  percent of the cases,  the laws prosecuting
insider trading exist prior to partial financial  liberalization,  insider trading starts to be prosecuted
27  See Akerlof and Romer (1993) and Hellman, Murdok, and Stiglitz (2000).
28 This index is published  in the International  Country Risk Guide (ICRG).  The law sub-index assesses  the strength
and  impartiality  of the  legal  system,  while  the order sub-index  assesses  the  popular  observance  of the law.  Each
index can take values from one to three,  with lower scores for less tradition for law- and order.
26in  only  11  percent  of  the  cases  before  the  partial  deregulation  of  the  financial  sector.
Interestingly,  law and order improves  substantially  following partial liberalization.  By the  time
the financial sector becomes  fully liberalized,  the  quality of institutions,  as measured  by the law
and order index,  has improved in  64 percent  of the cases.  Also, insider trading  prosecution  is
enforced in 44 percent of the cases before the full liberalization of the financial sector.
This evidence casts doubts on the notion that governments tend to implement  institutional
reforms  before  they  start  deregulating  the  financial  sector.  On  the  contrary,  the  evidence
suggests  that  partial  liberalization  fuels  institutional  reforms.  The  evidence  for  developed
markets is less compelling.  Still, insider trading prosecution is only enforced in  17 percent of the
cases prior to the partial liberalization of the financial  sector, but in this case, in 44 percent of the
cases,  institutions  improve  prior to the  full  liberalization  of the  financial  sector.  Again,  both
indicators show that reforms continue following partial liberalization.
There  are  several  reasons  that  can  explain  why  financial  liberalization  might  prompt
institutional  reforms.  First,  as discussed  in Rajan  and Zingales  (2001),  well-established  firms
may oppose  reforms that promote  financial  development because  it breeds competition.  These
firms  can  even  be  hurt  by  financial  development  as  financial  development  implies  better
disclosure  rules  and  enforcement.  (reducing  the  importance  of  these  firms'  collateral  and
reputation)  and  permits  newcomers  to  enter  and  compete  away  profits.  We  can  add  that
incumbents  may  oppose  the  removal  of capital  controls  as  capital  can  flow  away  to  more
attractive  destinations,  limiting their sources of funds.  However,  opposition may be weaker  in
the  presence  of worldwide  abundance  of trade  and  cross-border  flows.  In  these  times,  free
access  to international  capital markets  will allow the  largest  and best-known  domestic  firms  to
tap  foreign  markets  for  funds,  with the  support  for  financial liberalization  becoming  stronger.
27But  financial  liberalization  sows the  seeds of destruction  of the  old  protected  and  inefficient
financial  sector,  as  foreign  and  domestic  investors  (now  with  access  to  international  capital
markets) require better enforcement rules.
Second,  as mentioned  before, the liberalization  and the  gradual integration  of emerging
markets  with international  financial markets  by itself may help  to fortify the  domestic  financial
sector.  Foreign  investors  have  overall  better  skills  and  information  and  can  thus  monitor
management  in ways  local  investors  cannot.  Liberalization,  moreover,  allows  firms to access
developed capital markets.  Firms listing on foreign stock markets are also in the jurisdiction of a
superior legal system and have higher disclosure standards.
Third,  the  integration  with world markets  and institutions  tends to speed  up the  reform
process  to achieve  a  resilient  financial  system.  Capital  markets  can  help  supervise  domestic
financial  institutions,  imposing  stricter  market  discipline,  increasing  transparency  and  the
diffusion  of information,  and  even  pushing  governments  into  guaranteeing  that  its  financial
system is well supervised and regulated.29
To have a sense of the effects of changes in institutions on financial booms and busts, we
estimate the following regression,
amplitude, = a' X, + pAdi  + A3d 1sr + A  +,r'  +FA&O  +  d  +  Tdr  + ei  (4)
This regression is the same as regression  (1) but also evaluates the possible effects of changes in
government  institutions.  d,&°  is  a dummy  variable ,equal  to one  if the  boom  (crash)  occurs
when the law and order index has improved or it is at its highest level, and zero otherwise.  d,'TA
is a dummy variable  equal  to one if the boom (crash)  occurs following  the approval  of the  law
29  See  Gourinchas  and  Jeanne  (2002)  for  a  model  on  the  link  between  financial  liberalization  and  social
infrastructure.
28prosecuting  insider trading,  and zero otherwise.  d,E  is  a dummy variable  equal to one if the
boom (crash) occurs when insider trading prosecution is enforced and zero otherwise.
The results  are also  reported  in Table  7.  Note that improvements  in  the law and order
index trigger more  stable financial  markets,  with the amplitude  of booms and crashes  declining
about  18 and 9 percentage  points, respectively.  This evidence provides one possible explanation
of why  developed  markets,  with better  government  institutions,  do  not  experience  the  larger
crashes observed in emerging markets in the aftermath of liberalization.30
V. Conclusions
This paper presented a new approach to understand the effects of financial  liberalization
by introducing a novel database  on liberalization  and by focusing  on booms and busts  in stock
market prices.  Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First, our chronology of financial  liberalization  indicates that domestic and international
financial liberalization is a process in which different types of restrictions are removed over time.
Moreover,  while liberalization  has been an uninterrupted  process  in most developed markets,  it
has  been  characterized  by  reversals  in  emerging  markets,  in  which  capital  controls  and
restrictions  are  at  times  reintroduced.  We  also  found  that the  pattem of liberalization  varies
across  regions,  with  developed  countries  liberalizing  first their  stock  markets  and  developing
economies opening first their domestic  financial sector.
Second,  with  regard  to  the  possible  changing  nature  of financial  cycles,  our  analysis
showed  that stock market booms  and busts have not  intensified  in the long run  after financial
liberalization.  In fact, despite the claim that financial integration  leads to volatile capital markets
around the world,  stock market cycles  become less  pronounced after liberalization.  Still, in the
30 For more discussion on this issue, see Martin and Rey (2002).
29short run, we found that financial liberalization  does tend to trigger larger  cycles.  Interestingly,
the short-run effects of liberalization  vary across developed and emerging markets. The evidence
from  emerging  markets,  with  larger  booms  and  crashes  in  the  immediate  aftermath  of
liberalization,  provides some support to the findings of the crisis literature of excessive financial
cycles  following  liberalization.  In  contrast,  the  evidence  from  developed  markets,  with  larger
bull  markets  but less  pronounced  bear  markets  in  the  aftermath  of deregulation,  supports  the
view that liberalization is beneficial even in the short run.
Third, to explain the contrasting short- and long-run effects of financial  liberalization, we
explored  the  dynamics of liberalization  and institutional  reform.  We collected  information  on
the quality of institutions  as well as data on the laws governing the functioning of the financial
system.  The evidence  suggests  that institutional  reforms do not predate  liberalization.  Most of
the times, government  reforms  are  implemented within a few  years  after the partial opening of
financial  markets.  As  the  quality  of  institutions  improves,  financial  cycles  become  less
pronounced.  Perhaps due to lack of correct  incentives,  countries  do  not tend to improve their
financial systems before liberalization, disregarding the typical policy prescriptions.
To conclude, this paper opened several avenues for future research.  First, the new dataset
will allow researchers  to understand better the link between financial liberalization  and financial
development,  investment,  and growth.  Second, the richness of the data will allow researchers  to
better comprehend  the channels through which financial deregulation impacts economies.  Third,
more  research  on  whether  financial  liberalization  can  be  a  first  step  to  institutional  reforms
would be welcome.  Last but not least,  the relation between financial  liberalization  and reforms
leaves  unanswered  the question  of whether  countries  can  deregulate  financial  systems  without
becoming vulnerable  to crises.
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1999.  Pre  73  (Pm  73p)  mesns  that  the sator is already filly  (partially) hberlized at  that time, with no sgmflcant menasuos  taken  at that date.Table 2
Sequencing of Liberalization
Strategies of Liberalization
Proportion of Episodes in Which a Particular Sector Partially Liberalized First
Regions  (in percent)  S
Capital Account  Domestic Financial Sector  Stock Market
Asia  33  33  33
Europe  0  25  75
G-7  0  0  100
Latin America  25  58  17
Proportion of Episodes in Which a Particular Sector Fully Liberalized  First
Regions  (in percent)
Capital  Account  Domestic Financial Sector  Stock Market
Asia  0  55  43
Europe  13  25  63
G-7  20  0  80
Latin America  15  77  8
Duration of the Liberaliation Reform
Number of Months between
Regions  the Opening of the First Sector




Latin America  38
AU  Regions  66
Number of Months between
First Sector to Open  the Opening of the First Sector
and the Third Sector
Capital Account  J  107
Domestic Financial  Sector.  58
Stock Market  j  47
The bottom panel reports the duration of the liberalization  reform measured as the number of months between the partial opening
of the first sector and the partial opening of the third sector.Table 3
Characteristics  of Stock Market Cycles
Amplitude  Duratlon
Random Walk  Actual Data  Difference of Means  Random Walk  Actual Data  Difference of Means
Phase  mean)  (mean)  P-Value  (mean)  mean  P-Value
Booms  65  74  0.01  22  26  0.00
(0.10)  (3.59)  (0.04)  (1.24)
Crashes  55  61  0.05  15  1  8  0.04
(0.86)  (3.62)  (0.03)  (1.26)  1
Tne  table shows  the average ampltude and duraion of booms and crashes in stock  prices for the actual data and for the simulated data,
under null hypothesis that stock prices follow a random-walk process. The stock market indexes start in January  1975 and end in June 1999.
The filter used  identifies 146  stock market cycles.  To estimate the average  amnplitude of booms and crashes  under the null hypothesis of a
random  walk, we  first estimate a random walk  with drift  model for each country.  We simulate those models  1,000  times. Since the stock
market  series for several  countries  do  not span the whole sample,  the length of the simulated  random walk series  for each country is  the
same as the length of the actual series.  Amplitude is expressed in percent, calculated as a deviation from the mid point between the peak and
the trough. Duration is expressed in months.  Standard ermrs are in parentheses.Table 4
Determinants of Booms and Crashes
The Effects of Partial LUberalizatlon
AmplUtude
Independent Variables  ADl  Markets  |  Emeg1 g  Markets  |  Deveoped Markets
Booms_i  Crashes  I  Booms  I  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Change in the World Real Interest Rate  -5.03  3.878  4.909  6.821  4.10  -0.51
11.255]  *  [1.428]  [3.170]  [2.445]  [1.269]  *  [1.260]
World Output Growth  1.348  0.871  1.842  2.331  1.67  0.07
[0.613] *  [0.850]  [1.024] *  [1.555]  [0.801]  *  [0.671]
Domestic Output Growth  0.984  -0.84  0.662  -1.257  1.07  -0.60
[0.200]  -1  [0.409]  [0.290] *  [0.552]  *  [0.310]  *  [0.451]
Repression  60.878  66.865  70.415  74.449  41.37  59.98
[7.078]  *  [6.642]  [10.090]  [10.334]  *  [10.276]  *  [6.326]  *
Short-Run Lealization  80.466  77.896  96.218  95.449  63.92  47.82
[7.110] **  [7.037] *  [11.761]  *  [10.619] *  [9.089]  *  [6.616]  *
Long-Run Liberaization  44.106  44.087  52.547  65.572  38.07  34.22
[5.006] *  [4.462]  ***  [8.772] *  [9.560] *  [5.945]  *  [3.206]
Observations  140  141  60  61  80  80
R-squared  0.85  0.73  0.88  0.82  0.84  0.78
P-Value
Hypothesis Tests  Al  Markets  Eme  Markets  Developd Markets
Booms _  Crashes  Booms  j  Crashes  I  Booms  I  Crashes
Repression < Short-Run Liberalization  0.01  0.12  0.03  0.08  0.03  0.91
Repression > Long-Run Liberalization  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.25  0.36  0.00
Short-Run Liberalization > Long-Run Liberalization  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.03
The top panel  shows  egressions of the amplitude of  booms (crashes) in stock markets on changes  in the world real interest rate, wodd output growth, domestic output growth, a
dummy for "repression"  effects, a dummy for "short-rn libealization"  effects,  and a dummy  for "long-run  liberalization"  effects. The bottom panel reports hypothesis tests on
the regression coefficients. A country is considered to be partially liberalized if  at least two sectors are partially libealized.  Otherwise, the country is considered to be financially
repressed. The  change  in  world real  interest  rate,  the  change  in  world output,  and  the  change  in  domestic  output  are growth  rates from  the beginning to  the end of the
corresponding boom or crash. "Repression"  is a dummy variable equal to one if the particular phase of the cycle occurs during repression times, and zero otherwise.  "Short-run
liberalization"  is a dummy variable  that equals one if the particular phase of the cycle oocurs in  the immediate aftermath of  partial  financial liberalization  (four-year window),
and zero otherwise. "Long-run  liberalization" is a dumnmy variable equal to one if the particular phase of  the cycle occurs after four years have elapsed from the time of the partial
financial  liberalization, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in brackets. *,  **, e*  mean  sigrificance at 10, 5, and  I percent, respectively.Table 5
Determinants of Booms and Crashes
The  Effects of Sequencing
Amnlitude
Independent Variables  AD Msiretts  E  erdntMarkets  Developed  Marktsl
BoomS  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crshes
Change in the  World Real  Interest Rate  4.649  4.3  4.851  9.506  -3.64  .0.57
[1.252] ..  fi.485] ...  [3.068]  [2.250] "  (  1.329] *"  1.394]
World  Output Growth  1.426  0.85  1.676  2.522  1.77  -0.02
[0.613]  [0.895]  (1.008]  (1.467] *  [0.833] "  (0.7371
Domestic Output Growth  1.102  -0.847  0.905  -1.455  1.08  -0.60
[0.199]  "'  [0.426]  [0.277] "'  (0.525] .'  [0.320] "'  [0.495]
Repression  51.087  69.221  57.701  84.147  38.61  60.19
(8.127] . [8.208] "'  (11.533]  "'  [11.446] .'  [11.859] "'  [8.105) "'
Short-Run Liberlization  80.389  56.276  98.122  44.119  57.37  54.89
Sector One snd Two  [10.059] "'  (11.098] '.  (15.8701  ...  [16.507]"  (13.187]  . [9.726] .'
Short-Run Liberaization  -7.951  23.229  -12.258  59.247  40.71  -7.10
SectorTwo  [11.6411  [13.196]*  [18.227]  119.044]  [..  [15 180]  [11.976]
Long-Run Liberslization  40.147  44.96  47.606  63.974  34.98  33.58
[5.196] "  [4.794]  [8.595] "  [8.963]  f  [6.472)  [3.564]  *
Observations  132  133  58  59  74  74
R-squared  0.85  0.73  0.89  0.85  0.84  0.78
P-Value
Hypotbesis Tets  Al  Mar-ehts  Emern  Markets  Developd  Markets
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crabhes  Booms  Crashes
Repression <  Short-Run Uberalizaton
First Sector  0.01  0.83  0.01  0.98  0.12  0.66
Second Sector  0.01  0.17  0.02  0.10  0.09  0.88
Repression > Long-Run Ubertlization  0.08  0.00  0.21  0.07  0.37  0.00
Short-Run  Liberalization > Long-Run  Uberaization
First Sector  0.00  0.17  0.00  0.86  0.05  0.02
Second Sector  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.04
This table analizes whether the  sucessive libertlizations of the three  sectors  trigger more  unstable financial  merkets  (luger booms and  crashes) in the  short  run. The  top panel
shows regrsions of  the amplitude  of boons (crashes)  in stock markets  on the change in the wodd teal  interest rate.  world output growth, domestic output  growth, a dummy for
*repression"  effects, two dumrnies  for 'shon-ruo  liberalization'  effects,  and a dummy  for 'long-run  libemlization'  effects.  The change  in world real  interest  rate, the  change in
wodid output, and  the change  in domestic output  are  growth rates from  the beginning to thc end of the corresponding  boom or crash. 'Repression'  is a  dummy variable  equal to
one  if the panicular phase  of the  cycle occurs during repression  times,  and zern otherwise.  'Short-nrn  liberadization  sector one and two'  is  a dummy variable  that equals one if
the  paniculr phase  of the cycle occurs in the  immediate afRermath  of financil liberalization of  the first or second sectors (rour-year  window),  and zero  otherwise.  'Sbort-run
liberlization sector two' is  a  durrmy variable that equals one if  the particular phase  of the cycle occurr  in the  immediate aftereath of fnancial liberldization of the second sector
(four-year  window), and  zero  othewise.  'Long-run  libeeslization'  is a dummy variable that equals  one if the particular phase of the  cycle  occura after four years  have elapsed
from  the  time  of  financial  liberaliztion of the  stcond sector,  and  zero  otherwise.  The  bottom  panel  repots hypothesis  tests  on  the  regrssion  coefricicnta.  'Short-n
liberalization fust (swcond)  sector' corresponds to the test of the null hypothesis  that the opening of the first (second)  sector does  not trigger largfer  booms  and crashes relative to
repression  times or  long-run  liberaliztion, alternatively. If the  stock  market is liberalized  before  1973,  only the  capital secount and  the  domestic  financial sector are  being
considered in the analysis. Standard  errors are  in brscketL a, a,  "a  mean  significance at  10,  5,  and I percent, respectively.Table 6
Determinants  of Booms  and Crashes
The Effects  of  Sequendng
______  _____  ______  _____  _____Am  plitude
Independent Variables  Al Markeb  |  Enmrda  Markets  |  eveledMarkebt
Boonm  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Boom  Crasbes
Change in the  World Real  Interest Rate  .4.706  4.37  -4.756  8.079  -3.85  410
[1.263] '-'  [1.518] "-  [3.0921  [2.2271  *  [1.356] ...  11.402]
World Output Growth  1.356  0.89  1.86  2.953  1.75  0.19
(0.619] "  [0.914]  [1.073] '  (1.6871  '  [0.841]  [0.7431
Domestic Output Growth  1.097  -0.847  0.888  -1.635  1.08  -0.64
[0.1991 "'  [0.430] '  [0.2821 "'  [0.508] "'  [0.323] '"  [0.489]
Repression  S1.738  69.078  56.71  82.268  39.11  58.72
[8.159] ..  [8.2871 "'  [11.743] "'  [11.306] ..  [11.9741 "-  [8.0621  ...
Short-Run  Liberalization  81.618  56.46  97.193  45.445  56.55  58.78
Sctor One and Two  [10.113]  ..  [11.2441 "'  [16.076]  [15.955] "'  [13.5461  ].  [9.8921 "'
First Sector to Open:  Capital Account  -9.449  -3.216  -26.611  64.331  7.86  -21.95
[13.011]  [16.0441  123.260]  [25.5511"  [15.2981  [13.5391
Firts  Sector to Open: Stock Market  -26.004  -6.09  -7.518  40.538  -17.65  .26.94
[20.553]  [24.3981  [38.317]  [45.5991  [23.957]  [18.8631
Shont-Run  Liberaltzation  -3.94  24.453  -6.473  43.828  1.20  0.52
Sector Two  [12.0281  [13.952]  [19.058]  [19.2861  [15.865]  [12.528]
Long-Run Uberalizotion  40.749  44.893  47.186  64.876  35.00  33  42
[5.2181 ...  [4.837] ...  [8.679] . [8.788] ...  [6.558] "  [3.524]  ".'
Observations  132  133  58  59  74  74
R-squared  0.86  0.73  0.89  0.87  0.4  0.79
P-Value  _
HypothesbI  Test  All Markeb  Etsergil  Markets  jbveda  Markets
_Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crasbes  Boom  Crashes
Reprssion < Short-Run Liberalization
Domestic  Financial Sector  0.01  0.82  0.01  0.97  0.14  0.50
Capitl  Account  0.11  0.78  0.32  0.20  0.11  0.91
Stock Market  0.44  0.75  0.22  0.47  0.50  0.89
Repression >  Long-Run Liberalization  0.08  0.00  0.23  0.10  0.35  0.00
Short-Run Liberalization > Long-Run Uberalizatlon
Domestic  Financial Sector  0.00  0.17  0.00  0.87  0.06  0.01
Capita  Account  0.03  0.33  0.22  0.08  0.06  0.41
Stock Market  0.26  0.42  0.15  0.33  0.44  0.53
This table shows whether  the  short-rn effect  of liberalization  depend on  which sector  is deregulated  first.  The top  panel shows  regressions of the  amplitude of booms
(crashes)  in stock markets on changes in  the world real  interet  rate,  world output growth, domesUc  output growth, a dummy for 'repression'  effects, two dunnries for 'short-
run liberalization'  effects. a  dummy  for the capital account opening if this is the first netoor  to open,  a dummy  for the  stock market opening if this is the first sector to open,
and a  dummy for 'long-run  liberalization' effes  The change  in world real  interest rate,  the change in world output, and the change in domstic  output are  growth  rates  from
the  beginning to the end of the corresponding boom  or  crsh. *Repression"  is a dummy variable  equal to one if the particular ptase of  a cycle occurs during repression  times,
and  zero otherwise.  Sheon-run  liberalization  ector one  and two'  is a dummy  variable that equals one if the  particular phase  of a  cycle occurs in  the  immediate  aftermath of
financial liberaiation of  the  first and second wectors(four-year  window), and zero otherwie. 'Short-run  liberalization sector two'  isa dwummy  variable that  equals one if the
panicular  phoae  of the  cycle  occurs  in  the  immedite  aftermath  of financial  liberdization  of the  second  sector (four-year  window),  and  zero otherwise.  'Long-run
libernlization'  is a dummy  variable that equals one if  the paricular phase  of the cycle occurs after  four years have elapsed  from  the time  of fusocial  libedlization of the
econd sector, and  zero  otherwise.  'First  nector to  open: capital  account (stock marketr is a dummy  variable equal  to one if the  first  sector to open  is the  capital account
(stock  market). and  zero  otherwise.  The  bottom panel repots  hypothesis tests  on  the  regression  coefficients  'Short-run  libeaization  domestic  financial  sector  (capitl
account/stock marker  corresponds to the  tst of the null hypothesis that opening  first  the domestic  financial sector (capita  amcount/stock  market)  does  not trigger  larger
booms  and  crashes  relative  to repression  times  or long-run  liberaliation, alternatively.  If the rtock  market  is liberlized  before  1973,  only the capital  account and the
domestic  financial sector are  being considered in  the analysis  Standard  errors are  in brackets.  ,  *., *** mean  significance at 10,  5,  and I percent, respectively.Table 7




ProbabiltIes of UAberallzatlon Condidonal on
Type of Financia  LAbeailzatlon  Insider Trading Laws  Insider Trading Laws  Law  nd Order
Exi-tence  Enfomment
Parial Liberalization  36  17  44  "
Full Liberalization  64  25  50 *"
Hypothesis Test (P-Value)
Partial Liberalization - Full Liberalization  0.04  0.3  0.33
Emerging  Markets
ProbabilitIs of LUberlization Conditlonal  on
Type of Financial Uberallatlon  Insider Trading Laws  Insdder Trading Laws  Law and Order
Existence  Enforcement
Partial Liberalization  62  *'  I  I  18
Full Liberalization  77  **  44  *0  64 **
Hypothesis Test (P-Value)
Partial  Liberalization  = Full Liberalization  0.17  0.08  0.02
Panel B
Effects of Liberaiization  and Insftitutonal Reforms on Finandal Cycles
Ampltude
Independent Variables  m  Al  Markets
_  ~~~~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~Booms  Craubes
Change in the Real  Interest Rate  -4.496  4.05
[1.245]  00*  [1.442] **
World Output Growth  1.498  1.033
[0.609]  *  10.863]
Domestic Output Growth  0.963  -0.876
[0.  199]  Os*  [0.415] "
"Repression Times'  Dutnmy  63.696  69.188
[7.376]  "*0  [7.176]  *0
Short-Run Dummy  83.329  80.368
[8.245]  *00  [8.558]  *0*
Long-Run Dummy  53.259  50.923
[7.781 ]  *0*  [8.139] *'-
Law and Order  -18.316  4.984
[6.178]  0*0  [7.005]
Insider Trading Laws
Existence  2.159  4.627
[7.005]  [7.821]
Enforcement  0.543  -1.732
[7.560]  [8.422]
Observations  140  141
R-squared  0.86  0.73
Panel  A  shows  the probability of financial  liberalization  conditional  on  the existence  and  enforcement of insider trading
laws  and on  the dummy  for law and  order. Panel  B  reports the  regression reported  in Table 4 with  the  inclusion of the
institutional  variables: law and order, existence  of insider trading  laws, and enforcement  of insider trading  laws.  Law  and
order'  is a dummy variable  that equals  one  in periods  in which  there is a "permanent'  improvement  in the  Intemational
Country Risk Guide's  index of  law and order or the index is at its highest level.  The improvement  periods in this index are
characterized  by at least one point increase  in the index  from its two-year period average, and the maintainance  of the index
above  this  avcrage  for at  least  another  two  years.  'Insider  trading laws'  are  dummy  variables  that equal  one  after the
existence  or enforcement  of those  laws.  The  data  comie  from  Bhattacharya  and  Daouk (2000).  See  Appendix  Table  3.
Standsrd errors arm in brackets. *,  0*,  ***  mean significance  at 10, 5, and I percent, respectively.Figure 1
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The index of financial liberalization jointly evaluates the liberalization of the capital account, the domestic financial  sector,
and  the  stock  market.  The  index  is  a  cross-country  average.  The  value  three  means  repression,  two  means  partial
liberalization,  and one  means  full liberalization.  Developed  markets  include:  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, Germany,
Ireland,  Italy,  Japan, Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  United  Kingdom,  and United  States.  Emerging  markets  include:
Argentina,  Brazil, Chile,  Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand,
and Venezuela.Figure 2
Indexes of Financial Liberalization  by Sector
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The three indexes  evaluate  separately the liberalization  of the capital  account, the  domestic  financial  sector, and the stock
market. The indexes are a cross-country  average. The value three means repression,  two means partial  libealization, and one
means full  liberalization.  Developed  markets  include:  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France, Germany,  Ireland,  Italy, Japan,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,  and United States. Emerging markets  include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Hong Kong,  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,  Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Taiwan,  Thailand, and Venezuela.Figure 3
The Sequencing of Financial Liberalization
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The panels show the proportion of countries with (at least partially)  liberalized capital account, domestic financial sector, and
stock  market.  Developed  markets  include:  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  Fmance,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Norway,
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  United  Kingdan,  and  United  States.  Emerging  markets  include:  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,
Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,  Peru, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Venezuela.Figure 4
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identified  expansion episodes.Figure 5
Frequency  Distribution of the Amplitude and Duration of Stock Market Booms and Crashes
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The figures  report the frequency distribution of the amplitude  and duration of  boomns  and crashes for the  actual and simulated
data, assuming random walk processes  with drifR  The horizontal axis in each  figure shows the size  or the duration of boomns
and crashes,  the  vertical axis shows  the frequencies  in  percent. The Kolmogorov-Smimov  test  is used  to evaluate  the  null
hypothesis  of equality  of the  frequency distribution  of the amplitude  and duration of boomns and crashes  in  the actual and
generated data.Figure 6
Characteristics of Regional Cycles
Emerging Markets
Asia  Latin America
Phase  Amplitude  |  Duration  Amplitude  |  Duration
Booms  75  J  24  102  J  23
Crashes  60  18  86  16
Developed Markets
Europe  G  -7  |
Phase  Ampltude  Duration  AmpHtude  Duraton
Booms  72  29  53  28
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The table and  figure  show the  average  cycle  per region.  The sample starts  in January  1975
and  ends in June  1999.  The total  number of cycles  per region  is as follows: 28  for Asia;  35
for Europe;  44 for G-7;  and 39 for Latin America.  In the top panel, duration  is expressed  in
months while amplitude  is expressed  in percent;  it  is calculated as  a deviation  from the  mid
point between the peak and the trough.Flgure 7
















All Markets  All Markets  Emerging Markets  Emerging Markets  Developed Markets  Developed Markets
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Clashes
|  Repression  O Short-Run  Liberalization  El Long-Run  Libralization
- . . P-Value
Hypothesi  Tests  All Markets  Emerging Markets  DeoDed Market
Booms  I  Cmshes  Baeoms  Crashes  BemWs  Crashes
Repression  < Short-Run Liberalization  0.03  0.13  0.03  0.03  025  0.88
Repression >Lbe  rt  Lon-uRlbealiiation  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.31  028  0.00
Short-Rsn Lberalioation > Long-Run  jberalization  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.03
The figure shows the average  amplitude of booms  and crashes  in the different periods and markets (developed  and emerging). The table shows hypothesis tests  of  equality of booms
and crashes during repression times and after  liberalization. The repression period occurs when less than two sectors are partially liberalized. The short-rn liberalization  period is
deftned as the immediate aftermnath of partial financial  liberalization (four-year window), and zero otherwise. The long-run liberalization  period occurs after four years  have elapsed
from the time of the partial financial liberalization.Appendix Table I
Criteria to Define Liberalization Periods
Caph'al  Account
Criteria for FuDl  Uberulkzatou
Borrowing  abroad by banks and  Banks  and corporations are  allowed to borrow abroad mostly  freely. They may need to inform the authorities,
corporations  but the  authorization is granted  almost automatically. Reserve  requirements  might be in place but are  lower
than 10 percent The required minimum  mnaturity  is not longer than two years.
And
Multiple exchange rates and other  There  are  no special exchange  rates  for cither current  account or  capital account  transacdons. There  are no
restrictions  restrictions to capital outflows.
CrHteria for Partal LiberaDzatlon
Borrowing abroad by banks and  Banks and corporaions are  allowed to borrow abroad but subject to certain restrictions. Reserve  requirements
corporations  might be between  10 and 50 percent.  The required minimum  maturity might  be between two and five years.
There might be some caps in borrowing and certain restrictions to specific sectors.
Or
Multiple exchange rates and other  There  are special exchange  rates for current account  and capital  account transactions. There  might be  some
restrictions  restrictions to capital outflows.
Criteria for No Liberalization
Borrowing  abroad by banks and  Banks and corporations are  mostly not allowed to borrow abroad.  Reserve requirements  might be higher than
corporations  50 percent The required  minimum maturity might be longer than five years. There might be caps  in borrowing
and heavy restrictions to certain sectors.
Or
Multiple exchange rates and other  There  are  special  exchange  rates  for  current  account  and  capital  account  transactions.  There  might  be
restrictions  restrictions to capital outflows.
Domestic Financial Sector
Criteria for Full Uberalzatlon
Lending and borrowing interest rates  There  are no controls (ceilings and floors) on interest  rates.
And
Other indicators  There  are  likely no credit  controls  (subsidies  to  certain  sectors or  certain  credit allocations).  Deposits  in
foreign currencies  are likely permitted.
Criteria for Partil LlberaDzatlon
Lending and borrowing interest rates  There  are controls in either lending or borrowing rates (ceilings or floors).
And
Other indicators  There  might  be controls  in  the  allocation  of credit controls  (subsidies  to certain  sectors  or  certain  credit
allocations). Deposits  in forcign currencies might not be permitteod.
Criteria for No LIberalIzatIon
Lending and borrowing interest rates  There are  controls in lending rates and borrowing rates (ceilings and floors).
And
Other indicators  There  are likely controls  in  the  allocation of credit controls  (subsidies  to certain  sectors  or certain  credit
allocations). Deposits  in foreign currencies are likely not permnitted.
Stock Market
Criteria for Fall UberalDnaton
Acquisition by foreign investors  Foreign  investors are allowed to hold domestic equity without restrictions.
And
Repatriation of  capital, dividends, and  Capital, dividends, and interest can be repatriated freely within two years of  the initial investment.
interest
Criteria for Partial LiberalIzation
Acquisition by foreign investors  Foreign  investors are allowed  to hold  up to 49 percent of each company's  outstanding equity. There might be
restrictions to participate in certain  sectors.  There  might  be indirect  ways to invest  in the stock  market, like
through country funds.
Or
Repaiation of  capital, dividends, and  Capital, dividends, and interest can be repatriated,  but typically not before  two and not after five years of  the
interest  initial investment
Criteria for No LIberalIzaton
Acquisition by foreign investors  Foreign investors are not allowed to hold domestic equity.
Or
Repatriation of  capital, dividends, and  Capital,  dividends, and interest can be repatriated, but not before five years of the initial investment
interest
This table describes  the criteria  used to  determine whether the  capital account, the  domestic financial sector,  and the stock market  are fully or partially
liberalized.Appendix Table 2
Stock Market Indexes and Their Sources
Countries  Stock Market  Indexes  )  Beginning Date  J  Ending Date  I Base Period  ]  Data Source
Asia
Hong Kong  Hang Seng  Jan-90  Jun-99  1993=100  Federal  Reserve Board
Indonesia  JSE Composite Index  Dec-89  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Korea  KSE Composite  Dec-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Malaysia  KLSE Composite  Dec-84  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Phlllipines  PSE Composite Index  Dec-84  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Taiwan  TSE Average Index  Dec-84  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Thailand  SET Index  Dec-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Europe
Denmark  Copenhagen  Stock Exchange  Index  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Statistics
Finland  HEX-Index  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Statistics
Ireland  ISEQ Total Index  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International Finance Statistics
Norway  Oslo Stock Exchange  Industrial  Index  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Statistics
Portugal  Banco Totta &  Acores  Jan-86  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Spain  Madrid Stock Exchange Index  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International Finance Statistics
Sweden  Stockholm Exchange  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Statistics
G-7
Canada  TSE-300  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  Bloomberg
France  Average  of  40 Largest Enterprises  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International Finance Statistics
Germany  CDAX  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993= 100  Bloomberg
Italy  MIB Index  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International Finance Statistics
Japan  NK500  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  Bloomberg
United Kingdom  ASX all shares  Feb-75  Jun-99  1993=100  Bloomberg
United States  S&P 500 Composite  Feb-75  Jun-99  1993=100  Bloomberg
Latin America
Argentina  Bolsa Indice  General  Dec-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International Finance Corporation
Brazil  BOVESPA Market  Index  Dec-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International Finance Corporation
Chile  IGPA Index  Dec-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Colombia  Bogota Stock  Index  Jan-75  Jun-99  1993=100  international Finance Corporation
Mexico  BMV General  Dec-75  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
Peru  Indice General  IGBVL  Dec-92  Jun-99  1993= 100  International  Finance Corporation
Venezuela  Index de Capitalization de ta BVC  Dec-84  Jun-99  1993=100  International  Finance Corporation
The table shows  which stock market index is used for each country, its beginning and ending date, its base penod,  and its data source.Appendix Table 3
Insfftutional Reforms
Index of Law and Order  Insider Trading Laws  Insider Trading Laws
Countries  I  of  Existence  Enforcement
- ~~~(1)  1(2)(3
Asia
Hong Kong  Sep-93  1991  1994
Indonesia  Jun-91  1991  1996
Korea  Oct-91  n/a  n/a
Malaysia  Apr-93  1973  1996
Philippines  Jul-92  1982  No
Taiwan  No Change  1988  1989
Thailand  Apr-88,  Aug-92  1984  1993
Europe
Denmark  Highest Level  (whole sample)  1991  1996
Finland  Highest Level  (whole sample)  1989  1993
Ireland  Sep-89, Apr-96  1990  No
Norway  Highest Level  (whole sample)  1985  1990
Portugal  Oct-94  1986  No
Spain  Dec-91  1994  1998
Sweden  Highest Level  (whole sample)  1971  1990
G-7
Canada  Highest Level  (whole sample)  1966  1976
France  Jan-92  1967  1975
Germany  Highest Level  (whole sample)  1994  1995
Italy  Aug-95  1991  1996
Japan  Jul-92  1988  1990
United Kingdom  Sept-89, Jan-92  1980  1981
United States  Highest Level  (whole sample)  1934  1961
Latin America
Argentina  Dec-92  1991  1995
Brazil  No Change  1976  1978
Chile  Apr-94  1981  1996
Colombia  Mar-94  1990  No
Mexico  No Change  1975  No
Peru  Sep-92 1991  1994
Venezuela  No Change  1998  No
Column (1) reports  the dates in which  there is a "permanent"  improvement  in the International  Country Risk Guide's index of law
and  order. In this index,  law and order are  assessed separately,  with each  sub-component comprising zero  to three points. The law
sub-component  is  an  assessment  of the  strength  and  impartiality  of the  legal  system,  while  the  order  sub-component  is an
assessment of popular observance of the law. The improvement periods in this index are characterized by at least one point increase
in the index from its two-year period average,  and the  maintainance of the index above this  average for at least another two years.
This  column  also shows those  countries  for which the index  of law and order was at its highest level during  all the sample.  "No
change" corresponds  to no permanent  changes in the index.  Columns (2) and (3) come from Bhattacharya  and Daouk (2000). The
columns  report,  respectively,  the dates  when  insider trading  laws  are  aproved  and when  the  first  prosecution  under  these  laws
occurs.  The authors  surveyed  stock  market participants  and  national  regulators  to obtain the answers.  "n/a" means  not available.
"No" means that there is no enforcement of insider trading laws.Antex Taobe I
cMrozc2qq ef F1lnd:ohAl Ulrollznlfo;
in Jy 1980,  thc athorities eliminte  the  I-year  enininn  soity roqu  To  Jmny  1977.  creit cortals wore  abolished.  Also in 1977,  cel  ings  leonry 1977, an  Forein Invesment Lz  eased  previous restrictions on
for foreign  lotas. In JAne  19S1.  a  deal formign  exchane  mta was  intuoducd. In on  darsntic (lenaing  nd dap3sit) interest rates  wer  eiinannted.  In l  foreign  direct investn,  provided the  right of forein invesors  to recpatrte
December,  the  administration  that cam into  power  reurnd  to a mere  libnl  19112.  new  conomic authorities  introdiced a financial rfem  s,tin  capital aftr  three yers end rptite their pmfits and  dividncds withmot  cay
exchange  system,  unifyins  the exchange  emrekets,  eliniuing  the  interest  mie  n at  at  aiply  negtve  real  tno.  Credit  controls  weret-  contral  bn  prior  aproval.  Foreign  invesrtmnt  regulations  were  fffothr
insuance  and  swap  facilities  liberalizing  sales of  foreign  canuncy.  and  imsed in a lag  seals  basis. In Octir 19g7,  mnt domestic inrt  Ihnlized in  1980.  Prior cpprval was  no longer tequie  for investment in
announci  tlt  the  peso would  be  allowed to fle  It AFril  1982,  all asortizatio  rate regulations  were  eliminated.  Dementic  interes  rote  deagalti  may  of  the  counnays stockt  rteete.  prvided tat the amtoun  did not exed
payents  on  loo  other  then  impart-related  loans  were an  dzasbjert  to pl  waS ctnipitet4d  by th* end of 1989.  In 190, the  pmcess of  rmfrt  of  20%/6  of the  capital of the cepany involved. In  April  1982, the right  to frely
approval  of the  central  ba=nk  In November  1989,  a free  excitanga  rate  rms  baning  tertr continued.  Raenirng  controls on  credit at the  national  transfer profis  and dividends abroad  was 'tenrrily  suspended.  In 1989,
ittroduced.  In December,  proceeds  from  all loans had  to be  trensmcted  in the  f  l  tevel were  progressively eliminated until 1994.  the  Econamic  Emegecy  Law  fat*her liberalized  forign  investment  in the
cngarke  There were  no conditions on niannity,  daes, or inters  mtes.  In  stock  exchange.  Repatriation  of  capital,  profits,  ad  dividends  was  filly
19S0,  the  special  exdrnge  rate regime  for  espitae  aeccoant  transao  was  liberalized in  that yar.
~abolished.
in 1M,  oertin  financial  institutions  srei  authorized  to  obtain  esores  f  I  n 1976,  ceilings an dqoit and  lending rates  were  mved.  In  197S  In  1973,  pcrsons  doiciled or  resioits  abroad  eould  purchse  Brazilian
labroed  t  ihmi  the  issuaine of cerxmieal papem.  Brazilian  ans  located ard deo  ceilings  wiea  r-imnposed.  In  1988,  wine  lon  rates  were  commercial  and  industral  sec*rities,  pmvided  thai  transctions  were
wer  ataized to  isiar tadium-  and lona-t  crifites  of dposits. Bn  liberalized. In 1989,  dposits rats were  libamlized.  chbmneled  throuh  a Brazilian  tnvstnt conwny  and were  effeted  in
abroad  by ceoporotions  had a tinimran ntatuinty  term of cne  year.  In March,  tSt  Brazilian  etnef  exchangs  Capital  was  subject to  rtegstration  in the  cental
governatn  itntroduced a foregn exhanga intcabk ntark  for transections rze  bank ad bad  to renmsain  in th  comnmy  for at least  three  years. Rernittancs  of
to  c  te  rtpatriaton and profit and dividend  remittances.  In May  1992,  utartides  profits  and  dividends  woez  subject  to  certain  limitatiens.  in  1979,  thez
dn  the isuce of internatiard  bends withb  onnity less thdn  three  years  In  mdnirnum bolding period for ccpital repatriation  was reduced from three  to two
June,  fenign  investors  represented  by  fttnds  and  institutional  investors  were  yers. In 1983, it was reduced agin, fom  two years to three  mnths.  In 1987,
ttbrized  to  cperate  in  options  and  fiAme ttirts.  In Joatuay  1994,  th  foreign  portfolio  investent could  not  xoee  5% of the  ating capital  and
nutomantic autirtion of foreign  lons vias  suspraded.  Renewal  or extenwns  o  20% of the total  capital of a company. Now legislation gave foreign  investors
previous  loans  were  elco sbject  to a minimum  tern  of 36 or  96 mndths,  which  exemption  from  donastic  incomne  tax  on  capital  gains.  In  July  1989,
prevailed  for  new  loa.  In  March,  autmatic authoration  fr  issuing  bads,  emitiaeaces  abroad of profits and dividends  were allowed after  sixty days  In
cornmaril paper, and  er  fixed-income instnnments abroad was  termnntod.Aed.  June  1990,  the  government  announce  a  graduat  tiheralization  of capital
in  Mcrdi, the  gove=mr  introduced new resriectis on the constiutiona  d  rpatriation that was cosWleted in the following  year (1991).  In June  1991, the
*pamtis  of foreign msttutional  investos  In  October,  the financial  tranmaction  tax  Foeign  Investnent  Law  was  changed.  Until  that  smdtit,  foreign  prtfolio
foreIn  borrowing  win inceased from  3%  to  7%. In Mcrch  1995,  financial  i  s  inve  cod ivesrt in Brzil  only through country  ftuds.  By then,  foreign
non-financial  ittis  were  autborized  to  obtam  resources  from  abroad  by  investors  were  allowed  to  set  up omnibus  eaccosnts which  were  esaticlly
isuting commercial  paps, ntes, and  bhnds, including  stctaitins. AloO  in Much,  portfolios  of one or  more  shares  hld  in local  custody.  Besides.  foreign
dth  oinimem pzriod for new foreign loans was  lowered  frtn  36 to 24 months.  I,  ownership levels were  incremast.  Foreign institutiCos  could own nip  to 49% of
Febenary  1996, anamthr paccne of measures  ciaed at  resticting short-tern capital  voting cotimon stack and  IW1%  of nan-voting  particpating  prefered  stotL
inflows  wis  encted.  The  minunmon  overag  term fcr  contacting,  resnen  or  Snne  corporate  lirnitations  applied  (e.g.  Petrobnts  comon  socks  wns  off
extMndg foreign lon  was  ncreased fiam  24 to 36 monrts.  Barc at  wa  prmitmed  limits), and the  voting  class  (ON) of bns  e nW  t  available.
to  buy  and  sell  foreign  exchange  in the  fotward  market  without restiictis  In
1997,  the oinifnsmn  avempg  tesm for boroTwing  abroad was decreased from threa  to
ona  yer for mnw  Inm-s,  and to six months for r  bnwai  or extensions. In Apeil,  the
'tra  tax wse  reduced  to 2%.  In 1998,  the special  exchange rate  reinm  f
apitol  couat transactions was  abolihed.
In 1973,  erhtreid bns  were  allowed  to  borw abad,  but subject  to som  Under the  1967  Bank  Act, the  datminintion  of intrest rctes  on  lonn  In  1973,  there  were  no onrerols  ovar inward  r outward potfolio  investnmT.
guidelin es.  Corporations  were  allowed to itatie  bhods  abroad. bet warz  sbjct to  ws tlft to nztoe  forces.  Some  specific  restrictions  existed  an  inward  direct  invesurnst  in
Eine  controls.  No controls  were  in place  on  foreign  exchange  nnsactions.  n  brodcasting.  tclecomnmicatioos,  oenspetatien,  firthty,  crgy,  and
1974,  thez  freedm  for  chatered  bns  in coadiesng  their  foeign  cm  finncial  evies. Capitl  nd  income  could h frcly  patriatd.
operations  was incresed.  In February  197S,  the  1970  guLideline  rhateusted
2  to  explore  fully all  available  osurces  in  the  doinetic  matket  before
Lissot  bonds abrad win  lifted.  _  __  a_  9  -;,o  *,  ,> 1_-  t  s - . vr  'C?'  - D  t  mI  ca.  -.  ;.  fr,-  L  - -S  ..
In  1973,  all  new foreign browng  or trfnrngof etSangiedius  by  osaroci al  bh  msoum of  lending  anrd  depon  maes staed  in  1974  and was In  1987.  Law  1I.657  penued  foreign  capLal  unistmer  humds  to purcae bank,  except  for shorwtne  linas  of credit. wine sulect to prior apprval of th  omplted  by  May  1975.  Also  in  1974,  slective  cdits to  piorit  shna  issued by  Chilean  cotporatians  and other  securities  approved by  tde cemtm bank,  Corporatin  were  allwed  to  berow  aboad, but  wen  subject  tectem  wer  mosty  eliminsted.  In  1976,  quantitatisve  cedt  contmls  securitis  commission,  provided  dint  such  fnds  Dt  cerain  portfolio Vsome  exchonge  rte  regulations.  In  1977. die  special exchange  ret  regime  fo  were abolished.  In December  1982.  on:mercial  banks'  interest  mt  diversification  quirements and  had crtain  r=en paidup capita]  levels. capita]  eccat  transactio  wns  abolished  In January  1978,  a lisit on  extemnal  controls  wee re-inposed (deposit  and lending rates).  In  1984.  derosi  Aggregate  foreign  ownership  was  linited  to  25%  of shres  of a lited indebtedns  of connmcinl  bcnks  to rekad in local  cunmncy  (25% of capital  nd  rmae  were  orinly liberalized.  but the  indicative interest rare  for 30-da company.  In  May  1987.  a combn.y  tsastul  fund  was  introduced.  In 1992. resaves  of  ecch  bank)  wars  imposed.  In  1979,  nointerest  bearing  deposi  deposits  wan  sdll in  place. In 1985,  loan rates  ware  libealized. In 19S7  Chilean enterpires  we  athrtbized  to  itse ADR  In JaIuny, regulation requireDnt  an  foreign borrowinS  were inucodtrced  25%  for nirrities  less  tha  tde central  bak eiminated  its practice of  nnounrcing  indicative int  DL6CO  eased  restictions  n foreign investment and  reptrintion of capita]  to a I three  years,  15%  for  nntuiities  between  three  and four  yeas,  asd 10  fo  rtae  for 30-day  bank deposit.  minimun hoding  period  of one  year.  In August  1995.  authities  allowed manities  between four  and five years.  In  Jtt  the  pro-exiating limnit  on exteral  capital to be  rpatioe  after one year. indebtedne  of corntil bmins was eliminated.  In  1982  most capital  outflows
wee restricted.  and a special  exchange rate  regime for capital  acconin  otnsacti
w  inoduced. In May. anhorities imposed a  20% reserve requirement on foei
horroviing wih maturity of les than 24 months. In  July, authorities reduced  to 5%
the resave requimnt  on foreign borrowing  with tunlurity  of less  than  six years
I  Septe er 1985.  commeraial  banks wer allowed  to brrow abroad without 
restricns  or  prior  authorization.  In April  199I  new  regations  libealizing
foreign  exchange  market operations  wae induced  Previsly, those  operation
ware  prohibited  unless  under central  banks  specific auhwnization.  By  then,  al
umrnsactiOns  ware  perntted  unlss  specifically  restricted  by the  central  bank.
Jutne  1991,  a non-nmimted  rerve  requeiremnt of 20% was  itnpowd  en  direc
foreign borrwing  for tde  first tve  ,lldinmths. In May  1992, reserve trquirement
were  raised to 30%.  In Septemer  1998,  reserve  requiemnts  on capital infils
wre eliminated.
in  Janumy  1991,  under  the  Apertra  program,  authorities unified the  sexdm  A gradual liberlizaion  was  implemented  between  1967-1972, buit  In Janay  1991,  a new  foreign  invesent  code,  Resoluion  49,  cam  imto rare  sad controls on  bonrowing  abroad  wer  relaxed.  Authorities  mnintained som  controls  remaind,  like  ceilings  on  deposit  rates.  In Aust  1974  effect,  which  gave  foreigner  die  same  rights as  doestic investm.  Foreign controa on dte  capital acount to redure  tde volatility  of  caphal  flows, in ptlinterest  rates  on  loans  were hibalized  and  ceiling  on  deposit  rates  inves  could  not repatriate their capital  within one year of registration, but those of shn-tarm  noasre.  In Febrtnty  1992, resident  were allowed to bold forei  wer  substantially raised. Policies attempting to conol die arounts an  ware  frce  to do  so  thereafter.  In Ocber,  limitatons o  annual  transfers  of sKtoral  sad oter  foreign  prtfolio  investments  abroad  up  to  USS500,000.  In typ  of  loans  were  abandoned.  Also,  the  fianing of  preferential  profits were  aWished.  Capital  bad  to  be  regiatered  with  the  central  bask September  1993,  auboeities  imposed  a non-reamerated  47%  deposit  sectors  frnm  the  centrl bank was reduced.  After September  1980,  most  before  profiu  could  be  repatriated.  In  December,  Resolution  52,  which an  onrat  forein borrowin.  In 1994, forign lans with bmtrity rnging frontirt  deposit  intrent  tes were  freely  detertined. In 1982,  cedit  cmtrols  allowed  foreigners  to  purchae  Up  to 100%  of  ncally listed  companies,  came days to five yeas wine  std6ect to a nn-res  mrated  deposit requirement tngi  were grealy.  but not compltely, elimintedL  In  May  1984,  the centm into effect  Special regimes remained  in effect in te financial,  petroleum. mad from  43%  to  140%  of  tkhe  loan In 1996,  reserve  requiremntsn  of 50%  we  bank ireased  fram 8%  to 15%  the interest rate p3id  on the agricultural  mining sectars.  The purchase  of a 10%  or more  of the shs of a Colombian inposed en  eh  foreiga  crediu with a maturity  of less  thma  five years  Since Ma  bonds,  whicb were held  by banks as a forced  investmnt  eqmevahet to finrarial  imtation requird prior approval  by the Suprintdce of Bank 1997.  foreig  loans  (all  nrrities)  were  subject  to  nn-remtmatorted  deposit  16.5%  of their  loan portfolio.  From  Jnuary to Jme  1986,  authorities requiriuints of 30% of  tde loan  in  pesos to be held for eighteen  on  In  Jar  introduced  a tearsry (deposit  and  lending)  imerest  rate control. 1998, foreign  loan non-renserated  dposit requiremnts were reduced to 25% of  1990, all deposit  rates  at commercial bank  were mniet determined. In itk loan  in dorstie  cutency, and  the peniod  was shortened to twelve  months.  1994, directed and forced lending  to ngricultural  sector was reduced. September,  foreig  loan  no-rcua  erated  depot  requments  were  farthe
reduced to  10% of the loan in  domestic  trne¢y, and the period wet shortened
six months
In  1978,  the  purposes  for  which  Danish  firns  could  raise  loan  abrod  wer  In  Jcnuay  1973,  the  nerest  Rates Agreeomt  tdnt  regulated  r  In  1973,  nomesideots  could  freely  purehase  or  subscribe  Donisl  shares, confined mainly to the  financing of fixed  investments  nd foreig  trde. Firnanca  rtes wans  abolished,  nd since then,  knding imtrest rates  have bece  whether officially  listed  in the main Copenhagen  sock  mrkd or listed thoe loans  with  mauities  greater thn  five  years  could  be  raised abrad  by  busim  increasingly  independent  of dte official  discount  nte.  In  1975,  at *street  or  catrb'  madoet prics, provided  the prehe did not  represent a firms.  In 1983, autrzaio  wns gives  to dorestic  corpmtioos to borrnw nb  I  berest Margins  Act of 1975  imposed  a maxinum betee  the avow  direct  investnMt and  was not  being mode  with a  view  to  scquest dimet wi  restricions, providled that  the maturity of such  loans was at last five  years  of baoks'  kending  end deposit  ates  In March  1979, this  Act and cailin  investncet  in the comarny  concead  Capital  and  incoe  reparition  wa Financial  lans  ware  no  longr  restricted  to  the  financing  of  fixed  h  e on deposit  rates  expired.  This agement  was replaced  by  a new  e  free. investment,  they could  be  raised  for any  busriness  purpose.  In October  1988,  al  between  the central  bank and  deposit  money  banks  on  lending i'l" renaining foreign  exchange regulations  wae lifted,  rates.  Participart  banks  and  savings  banks  wne  obliged  to  freeze  w
lending rates at tde lwvel  of the  first qurter of 1979 (A4ustment wsud
take place in aecerdance with  changes in the disct rate) the banks
signing  the  agrements  were  offered  more  faverable  bowia
contditions at the centrl  ank.  in Jane  1981,  this agroet on  din
imtert raes ended._ 4-.,5 . . tomor.  ,  .'V.  *4  5e '-9  t  - 1,
In  1973,  lnding  to  n  aesidn  was estricted  to axp  cft  oIn  197,  In  19an  avsg  Icudn  rates  wee abolished.  Howver  In 1973,  oretida  coald pich3se  bonds, dbeeres.  i shores  qotwd  on
anraiztnel  banking  ctivtes  of Finnish  ahoized basc  wee  liberalized,  ltting sates  raisiS coder rs  certsesrino since  all  oans e  the Helsinki  Stack  Exchange trgh an  ed  ba,  agne  cone t  -a  to cein  sW visy rep  reqin  nts.  In Aust,  repilanos  to a hase  r a  calnaled by  tbe Basis  Of Fil  In M=nt  1909,  or  estdIY  convrilb  curenctas  or  by  debitig  a  ornvmtb!e  Matam
foreig  besniwing  were eiminated  for credits wit toannity of  leas  five yam& Ictanl bsk  retdC O itset  cos  d ovar dlocaion  of cmedit  Only  acccesmt, cnd  neresidesu wet  el  ap ted to  sell  them truSh  the bak
,,  1929,  reijalio  an  foreign  bTo  n  wme  dirr  d  for  edi  teaD  of  f'  oren  on  bank  klding  wu  isi  es  and  to  freely  repteri  die  Foceeds.  No  paniion was needed  for  the
turity of at  lert cn  yer.  In  199,  tkb  regulatim  on  outwad  cad  capit  M.  the  m  ofsa  b=s r  as a reference  rar  fornw laons  was lasGZ  acquiSitio  of  hMes  With flin  clssified as capital arCCOSIa,  however,  the
trun  a were  brondly  liberalized. In Jluary  1991,  cdl  foign exchange  ma  diccontirraodp  Fprods could ant be trensfkid  broad  withuat a pemimsarl  from the canal
w  ie  ciinat94  cxcepi those  regadilS te  raisinS  of leans  ab  d by  pi  bask  in  1990,  the reglaions  oan  oauward ad inward copid  tmsfen wee
orporations,  in  Jlen, the  Bank  of  Finland elimtd  all  contmrls  on  broasly liberalized. Te  sale  to n  si  of derivatie itruceas  bhsed
by pri  copoions.  on  DFinnrih  sa  e  i  d  wmaTm  was  perised.  Hower,  because  of
restricts On  foreig  ow  rshia, retained shar  cud no be tansfed to
fiesigo resident.  in Febsary  1990, Finnish  companies waee alowed to issue
sheses  abroad withoutl p  mshorizsiin. Almo,  it was  so  eonger  rreasy fIr
nonresidests to effect thcir p  Fdela of  Fiemish recsritis through  the HSE  in
1992,  se  act  oen  ttl  fimds  was  rnated to as  to  give foreignrs the  ri&bt
to  own  rnts i  thr  flend  Senas  restrictions  on  foreign  ownership  ill
epplied In 1993,  the  restictiosran fudge  owoaship (cap  lImits  on ctein
eters  and laity Finitsh companies)  wme  lifted. Namidts  reme  allorwed
to p;rdss  Finnish  recurities  sad to owrn  Fimish corpotions  witht cny
estrictiona
in  1905,  tdz req%ireaezrae  ane  dirTet  inveatenit abrod  ta  cholirbad.  In J3a, in  195,  (dpoasit  cad  laedIo)  interest  rate  ceilins  we  r  mstl  In 1973.  Paripation  exceedir3  20%  of  the  qLsoed  flrees  capital  we
bash were  freely allowed to conact f  creign  artuescy leCs  and bw  in fa  elummaed.  in 196, thc c-ilina  sad saelctivity  of cradit policies  w  consdre  dirt inveGt  rad requred  prior  declattisa  to thdi  rnitisty of
ap to  50 rmillionL  In :an  19.9, lintitaics on  tdi festi,a  each  e pseitian  oa  dchiad.  Credit calacivity we replaced  by  isphiucit  credit subdr  In finance.  French  secutrites  hold in Franc  by  oametidate; cotld be  expoused,
cnonrrciAl  hae  were raboishd.  Effve  Iarnsry 19M, all reo  aexa  Jnae  J  iy  1907,  credit  controls  ere  co  leely  renved.  Tlh  provided  that  they  bd bean  depsaitod wdith  ramizad  b  in  a for 1reactien  with rspet  to  cpital w  uer  e  hblixkad  BeTowi  cng  cd  onrpLasry ratio  for a  t  wea  abolish  dasier. French rnd  foreigS  seciriliers held  under  a foar  dasicr could  alo
inFreae  fircs or  fereiga  iasiss by  physical  or jasidical  prwss,  be  cold  in Frtnce sod  the srle  proceeds coud  be trnmferd  abroad with no
. public  or private  Freet  residents,  or  by bibras  or  bAiriaes  in Frau  of  resticti.  Te bnansfer  brhcad  of  nsiresid-ovnoed first  in Fra  i  em
ifridical prerons,  wrA  reistered ofwice  win abad, we3 ursatrirted.  restricted.  Lfjestifyng decicrls wre  recm  F  ed ead certain  eschanne ceanrol
reqicemces  wee ort,  hori2cd  bank  were pemitd to awrove,  withers
cay liatitffon, a  ionaE  for  rofits amd  dividends rep=tciani  In Deaber
1989. reatrii  regardin  foreign  diret  innsurtn  in endiatisu  French  firon
were  looseaed,  mminly  by reducing  the  pried duringtbe  thi otoiairy of
finonce  coul  cempd  (for noz-Etnea  CemLuaty  ivstemsa)  the  ccqutist
of paticipation in  an aiming Freecb finm.
in 1973,  b=!m wee eubjeat to high  aosntimn resorve rqitacnat  on  the  level o  Ceilings  on iscmt  ten wrme  abolished  in  1967.  AMd  the weme  s  In 1973,  psevioa  eppovnl  for  r  ds  diret iavet3tem  in Qem3sy
their foreins liabilities  vith  nzturities  of lees  thnm  four  yes. Be  feriga  cretdit consuls  ainc  2973.  and  purchas  of  Qmn  or  ferei  equitis  VW reqir  However,
carrency baTomnsi  thst wse  wonedistly re  es=  abo2d  V  exemlpted  II=r  nonesidents clnd fnely repatriate  capital and inconr.  In 1974,  this spjsval
the  ainiun  rveGr  rc  ien  . Cslh  dpM-  requfene'  were  ppllsd  tn  ws no loner required.
certain borrowing  anie by reside  from  nn  adtrts. Ths  prior aprval of the
oesmsi  bark was required  for  oles to n  a  ts  of all dfanes  eney  mmb
p  eand of fixed-iareat  securfits of grmin  isswes with  les td3n  four ye
i-enniig  to  [n12aity.  No  spial  ech  e  rate  rqet  for  tpiaul e
existed. i  Febsry  1974,  Butdesbank approval  reqireent  ra
lifted  for  all  bonwing  abod  allo  by  resIL In  Madc  19S0, G
l  the  mnini  rarity for  deesestic  fixed-intest  securities eigible for
s.i  to  c  a  ron foar to  two y  ard ia  Nwntber, it ws  fin
reduced  Amber  to oa  year.  In  Denber,  thd Bundesbank  conchlded  with  ths
r  nSa cialme  ba2^  a gm  en  grenra amr  vnnly  rmaw  en Capitla
ic  n  In Mrch 19S1,  restrictions  to tbs ci  ofGerman eeny airket pprdr 
fixod-iaserst seites  to  nonresidents  we  lifled.  This  impied  a  de  fra
a  Si  of  ite  renE3ii  restiio  on capital  tansani  The agremrosc
_  leh51y rt  stricals  an capitaI  ePDU WaS  ended_  *>T  .,-=  ::  iT.  '.  - ,  >,  s  Sw- ._.l-  - ,  - - .,  _  _  __  _  _  __  _  _ _  In  1973,  rhere were  no  resmneons  on  borrowing  abroad  by  corporations  In  In  1973. the  lending  and deposit ren ollered  by banks  acre  subjet  w  In  1971,  no  restnrcions  applied  on  acquisitions  by  forgners  and  on January, the  exchange control  was  abolished, lI  Septeamber, banks  were  free  to rtm  the interest  rates amngentent of dte Exchange  Bank Association, but the repatriation of  capital and  income. poesidons  in any cutnency withori  any  consultation.  raes  offesed  by  deposittaking  companies  were  not  As a  resudt.
deposit-taking copnies were  in a better condition  to attract  depost
by offering  batter  rateL Nevertheless,  the rtes closely  followed m2S
conditions. There were no credit comtro  in place, except for sonme  sl
lived  lonms  to  mnall  scale  industries.  In September  1983,  following
large  fall  in  the  stock nrket  index  and  a  rim agains the  currency,
intrest  rates  adrniistened  by  the  Hong  Kong  Associatin  of Banks
were  increased  twice,  in October  and  November.  After the  stabilizati
. of the currtncy,  rtes wer  reduced, In Otobe,  the witiholiwng tax
interest  on  donestic  curTestcy  depsits  was  ne  ved,  In Augum 1994.
the HKAB announced a dtmetable  for the remwval  of the inteest rte  cap
on time deposits. In Ocober,  rate CapS  in deposits with  maurity of more
than  a osth were deregulated.  In  Jauary  1995, intest rate  caps
deposits  of mmre  than  swven  days  were  removed,  In  September,  the
Hong  Kong Monetay  Authority  removed  the  ceiling on  time  deposits
fixed for seven  days. It also annotumced  no finther liberslizatios of ntc
on deposits with naurity below seven days.
h  1978,  a  special  exchange  rate  regime  for  current  account  transactions  In  1978, private  banks  were  allowed to  sat  their own deposit  rates, bt  In December  1988,  the govemment  introduced  deregWution  measues to allow introduced.  The  deposit  requirements  for  forign  cuirency  libilities  b  state  banks  could  set rats only for  rupiah  deposits of three ntonths  foreignera  to purchase  shares  in  eight not-joint  venture  companies.  In 1989, corporations  were abolished, A 15%  reserve  requirement was applicable  to fonmig  less  and for  foreign  currency  depoasits.  In  1983,  moat  loan rates were  investor  were  gramned  the  right to  repatriate  capital  and  profits.  Tbe  law currency  liabilities  of foreign  exchange  bhnks.  In  1979,  the  special exchange  liberalized, credit  ceilings were  abolished,  and centraly oriented cmdi  provided  thud no transfer  pernit woud  be issued for  capitl  repatriation  as regime for  current  account transactions  was  abolished. In  1988, almost  all  (excep  was  geatdy  reduced,  In June.  state  banks  were  free  to  set  their  ow  long  as investment  benefits  fom  tax  relief  were  being  received.  Howeve, for open  position  limtits)  restrictions  on harrowing abroad  were  lifted In  1991,  deposit  rates  on  all  clsses  of time  deposits,  In  1990.  banks  were  foreign payments  did nrc  rquire a transfer  permit  In August  1989,  foreigners ductin  on bank's net open  position was impltenmted to reduce  banks'  access  required to allocate 20% of loans to small businesses.  were  allowed to pureuhse  up to 49%  of all companies  listed shars, including foreign borowing.  In  March,  the  central  hank  adopted  mesus to  discosp  forign joim veatus, bu  excluding  bank shares.  No pasn could purcbas foreign borrowing.  The Bank of Indonesia began to scale down its swap oprnadons,  mre than 1% of any collective investment'sccuity.  In  1992, the exclusion of reducing  individual  banes  limits  frrnm 25%  to 20%  of capital.  Tbe  tha  bank  shares was eased and  forigner  were allowed  to buy listed  shares (up to swap  premtism  was  raised  by  5%.  In  Novenber,  bank's  sbort-tenm  faig  49%) in tbree categories of banks-  private national, stats  owned, and  forign exchange  liabilities  could  not  exceed  30%A  of  thdir  own  capitl.  A  rsa  joint  vaeture.  In  December  1997.  foreign  companies  wre  suthorized  to requirsasmem  of  2%  was  applicable  to  foreign  currency  liabilites  of  foaeig  purchase, wiDhout linit, shares issued by Indonesian nonbank  companies in the xchange banks  Fins cod also obtam foreign  credit subject to a 30% restive  nDonesian  Capital mnuser requiereent for a year.  In  1992,  the central bank linmited  banks'  short-terr  fori
liabilitis to 30Y.  of capital.  Borrowing  abroad  required  a prior apprval of the
cenrua  bank,  In  1996,  foreign  exchange  banks  wre  usbiect  to  centrtJ  banl
directves with  respect  to borrowing  abroad.  A prior  approval  of the team set  in
1991  was  requited  before  the  acceptance  of a lon  from  abroad  An  annual
borrowing  ceiling  was  imposed  by  the  centr  bank  on  forign  comnnercial
g bomrwing of more than  two  yeats  of maturity.  hi  1998,  a special  exchange rue
regime  for capital tansactions  was introduced.
In  1978,  the specal  exchange  rae trepne  for  capital  acconmt  tmacdoons  In  May  1985.  the  cental  bmo  anneunced  a  now  and  more  m  h  In  1973,  puases  by nonresidents of Irish registered  securities  bad to be abolished,  In  1979,  the  centmr bank  suspended  the  50%A  deposit  requirement  on  riented  an  ement  for  the  deteminaidon  of (leding  and deposit)  funded with  foreign  currncy  from  an external  accounL  Also,  purchases  in inflows  of  capital  through  commercial  banba  In  September.  restrictions  ol  interest rates  by the  Associated Bak  In the pas  changes  in intct excxess of  certain  anmotst  had  to  be  notified  to  the  central  bank.  Some acquisiion of foreign  securities  were  eased. In  1980,  exchange  control apprvat  es by these  banks had to be approved  by tde  central bank. Since Ma  resrictions  also  applied  to  repatriation  of  capital  and  income.  Exchang required for all  transfes of capital to  nomresideats.  hn  1988, lending of bi  1985,  eacb  bank  was free to  decide its knding  and deposit rates  subject  control  approval  was  required  for all tranfes  of capital to noresidents.  In currency to nonsidenat  began to be peritted lo the extent d  the  lnso  a nmaxinrum  permnissible prime  lending raeset by tecentrl  banl  1992, restrictions on acquisitions  by  foreigner  and  repatriation of capital  and were parties to comtmml  tradns  ons with  residentsL  Residents were  allowed  February  1986,  tht  central  abnk  tnupended the  aunmrgment  governin  income  were lifted. bomw foreign cwrency for any propose,  brat  an approval of the centrl bank had  to  Associated Bank interest rates (lending and deposit rates). be obtained wben dte  bomrwing  was not  for the  financing of trade. Since  January
,1992,  residents  were allowed to  borrow  in fomign  currency  for n-Ftrade pwps
widtumt  restricions.  Also  in  Janusuy.  exchange  controis  on  ouward  capita
transfes  were  eliminated,  In  September,  resident  were  prohibited  from  r.
financial  loa,ns  I  rish  pomnd  fo  perios  of lss thn  one  year  to norsidnts
V 'vithort the taemission of the central bhn  Forwad formixa  exchange  transactions7  in Irish pounds  for speculative pwoposes were prohibited.  The minimum nmaaity o
allowable  forward  tmansactions  was  21  days.  In Jamnry  1993,  all conos wer
eliminated.
In  1982,  the  special  exchunge  rate  reimpe  for  caoital  accotu  tansactions  was  In  1974, (deposit amd  lending)  interest nte ceilings were eliminated.  In  In  1973,  foreign investment  of any kind was peinttied  freely.  No restrictions
eliminated, but the deposit  requiretneni  for investment  abroad was  still in place.  1975,  deposit  interest  tate  oeilings  were re-establisied.  In  1981,  they  applied  to capital  and  profit repatriation.
1983, certain  sects  were  cxempted  fronm  the  50%  non-interest  bearing deposit  were eliminated.
requirement.  In  Jly  1994,  a  ceiling  on  foreign  indebteess  by  banks  wa
introduced and chlininated  in December  1985.  but  some  retnictionts still remainedt.
In May 1987,  the deposit requiretent  for invesrnent abroad was abolished.  In M
1990, most  restrictions  on borrowing  abroad by banks wer  lifted.  In  1992, dm
wee no conools on banks'  foreign borrowing.  Banks wer  only  obliged  to declar
transfers  by  filing  out a special  cstms  form.  There  were  also ta  cooatrson
corporations'  foreign  borrowing  Residents  were  free  to  und  e  f  ria
usnsactrmts  with nomresidens, including  l  oa_s.
In  1979,  controls  on  inflows  werc  eased.  In  January,  die prohibitio  segin  In  1979,  interest  rate  deregulation  strted.  In  1991, interest  rates  on  In  1973,  there  were no restrictions on reqptiation  of income.  Acquisitions of
nontesidents'  purchases  of bonds  with renuining rnnity of less thanr  five  yea  l  almost  all time  deposits held by  corporte cliets werc  ftuly libealize  securities  for portfolio investment  could  be mode  firely  through  designated
was entirely lifted. The Japanese  authorities  iniplemented major rcforms daring  at the end of the year. Also in  1991.  the thare of deposits with maret  secturities  firms.  In  othr  occasions,  a prior  notification  without  a waiting
19S.  Thbese  reforms  included  the deregulation  of  cross-border  trnnsaci  derceined  interest  rates arouned  to  75% of total  deposits.  In  Jul  period  was required  In 1976,  foreign owneship lauits applied  In principle,
improvements  on access  to  foreign  financial institutions  Stuating  in July  1980  1991,  direct  quantitative  contols  on  credit  wer  abolished.  In  Juna  acquisitions  by  foreign  investors  were  subject  to  validation  or  license.
Iaqaee corporations were  allowed to issue  bonds abrad,  provided that  advance  1992, the liberalization of iterest  mrtes  on time  deposits was completed.  However,  acquisitions of stocks for portfolio  investment were  autonatically
notice was given.  Deregulation continued during the 1990s and it was  cornpkted  Tbe frist step to deregulate demand  deposits was take.  PFostal v  approved by thc  Bank of Japan All these  acquisitios had to be made agiinst
1990s.  inrest rates  emined  eg  d  yen  proceeds  firnm the sale of  foreign  exchange  if  the  investor  wished to
obtain remittance  rights  upon validation.  In  1985, coirtmls  on outflows wean
casedL
In Januey  1979,  the Koran auxhrities revised their exchiaue controI esubtion  In  1988, loan  rates from  banks and  nonbank financial  intermediaries  In 1984, the repatriation of dividends was filly permitted. In 1991,  repatriation
to  pcmtit  donmestic  banks  to  lend  to noaresid,ts. bt  not  to  borrow abraodt.  tn  other t  nerst rates on loans subsidized  by government  finds, wem  of capital  became  freely  permntted.  Market  opened  to foeign  investors. A
1993, a capital  act liberization plan was  anuncedo  givng  geater freedom  fo  liberalked. Intrest rates  on time  deposits with maturities of toe ta  notification  system  nade  authorization  of  foreign  investment  subject  to
residents concerning capital  outflows.  Despite she  capital  act liberalzation plan,  two  years at banks,  postal  savings, and credit  unions, and on timne  an  approval  or  notifation.  Foreign  participation  becameceastor  under  the
sdemble  restrictions  enamind on capital inflows: bond-holding by nomcsid  savings deposrts with muatrities of over one  year at miSral  savings an  egulations. In  1992. foreign investors were periritted to iTvesw  in the domestic
was  allowed indirectly  througi  the  Korea Trt  and Coumtry  Fund, direct ho  finance companies  wer  liberalized. Short-term  deposit  rates  were still  stock  ntarle,  subject  to the estriction that foreign  ownertbip of listed finms
as allowed only for  convertible bonds  issued  by small  and nediumn tnwprises;  under the attthorities'  control.  Bank of Korea  also controlled  the  total  could not exceed 10%  of total equity, and they could not boWd  mrte  than 3%
c companies could use  forein  commercial  lorans  within certain  limits on  vohzme of credit  and  the minintrm  caedit  gudelnes  to  snull  and of total equiry.  Investosents  in stocks by resident foreign frnial institutions
the imtport  of capital  goods  and for  foreign direct  investment (FDI).  In 1996,  mediutm  firms and oonglonaites.  In 1991,  the govent annmouced were subect to the samn  lirtits as those  by institutions owned by  nionrsias.  In
ltongtrm  borrowing  was  forbidden in practice,  but shorttertm  foreign  fmour-stage  plan  for  intrest  rates  deegulaotin  (deposit  and  endin  1995, the ceiling on  stock investment  by noresidents  was rased twice.  The
was penmitted  rnder the  egulations governitng  open exchange  positions  In 1998,  rates).  In  November,  short-term  ledig  rates  (bank  ovenhnPi  ceiling on  aggegte purchases  was raised to 12% in January.  and to 15%  in
borrowing  abroad  by  high-tech  foreignfinsanced  manufactring  companies  was  discounts  of conmrcial  paper,  and  trade  bills)  were  liberalized.  IJ  uly.  In  1996,  the ceiling  on  aggregate  purchascs was  inctreased  to  18%  in
allowed  rPto 100%  of the forigsn invested capital.  Howev,  maturity was  lintited  1995, all lnding rates and  most deposit rates wee dveglated, cxcept  ApriL and to 20°h in OcobCr. The ceiling on individual purchases was raised
three years or lss and limitations wee imposed  on the use of finds  In April, governes  suprted  lending  and  denvid  deposits. In  1997,  all  to 5%. In  1997,  ceilings on foreign ownhrbip of Korean equities were  raised
autlrities  abolished regations on  age of  long-eem  lIom  with maturity ofve  ading  nates  were  freed.  In  July,  remaing  restrictions  on  deposi  four  times  (May,  Novembe,  and  twice in  December).  In  December,  thes
ve yetars  tat were brought mto the  country by foeign munfacttm.  interest rates  were ehminated  In January 1998.,  all direct  resictions on  cilings  wcre  increased  so 50%  and to  55%.  In  May  1998, tbe aggrgate
lending to  pruhibited sectoms  were completely abolished.  ceiling on foeign direct investuent  mn  Korean  equities was  eliminated, and
equity investtrinit in non-listed  oompanies was permitted.n 1973,  no special exchange  rate regme  for capital  account transations  existed.  In Ottober  1978. the liberlizadon of  (deposit  and lending)  intcerst rte  In 1973,  repatriadon of capital  nd  income was fre.  Since  May, all  payments
My, the new exchange  control regulatons  opened up  opportunities  for banks  ad tated  In October  1985,  controls on deposit and lending rates  wer  re.  for  capital  repatriatdon  up  to  USS400,000  were  firely  approved  by  any
corporations  to epand considerably  their foreign exchange  operations. Bonin  imosd  by  resticting  the compeitive  bidding  up  of interest  mte  conmercial bank  Payments in  excess  of that anmoutt  required  the approval of
byMalaysian  residents from noresidentsrequiredtheapprval  oftheControllero  among  banks.  In  Febnsay  1991,  those  controls  were  completcl  the  Controller  of Foreign  Exchmge,  which ws  frcely  given  under  noralm FxbForeign  E  chn  wbich was  firely given  on all  loans  raised on  onab  eliminated,  circumsan  In July 1973, the  Malaysian stock exchange was established. In and used to prnducdve purposes in MalaysiaL  In June  1979.  bormowing fr  confornity  with  the  liberalization  of  the  Malaysian  cxchange  control nonresidents  by  banks  and  crporations  was  freely  perzinted,  but only  up  to  regulations. all nonresidenta  were penmitted to trade freely in  all  shar  listed.
ctain  limit. In January  1987,  resident borrowers  could borfow  up to USS400.0  without  any  need  for exchange comol panission  En  1975,  the generl  aim from  noresidents  wxitout  obtaining  ny  permission.  Lager  nDo  requn  was  that  foreign  investment would  be allowed  in the proporton  of 30% of
ion  from the  Controller  of Foreign  Exdcnge,  which was fiedy given  foreign equity and  70% of Malaysian  equity.  New import substiuon  projects finar,e  prductive  ctvity  in  Maaysia  From  Januay  to  August  1994.  al  had to have  IO0%  Malaysian  ownrship. Inuses exporting momre  tan 80%
e  were  prohibited  from  sellmg  short-ternt  m3nebtay  insuments  of their  production and  using mainly  inported matrials  could be  considered
onrcsidents. In Septenebr 1998,  exchange contros wne  introdced,  for majoity foreign ownership,  ranging  finm  51%  to 70%, but in ecepdondl
cases,  100%  foreign  owneship  could  have  bhn  considered.  In  1984,  a
relaxation of  thes  regulations  on foreign owneship  was announced.  Majority
equity  shares  could  be beld  by foreign  fns engaged  in capitl-intansive  and
resoumre-orieste  enterprises.  In addition.  the  possibility  of 100%A  foreign
ownership,  preously  limpited  to  e  apo  industies,  was  extended  to  oher
sector.  In  1988,  foreign stock bronage firnm  were  allowed to  increase ther
equity  share  in  local  brokere  firnns  from  30%  to  49%.  In  1992  the
guidelines  on  forign  equity  capital  owneship  were  liberalizd.  Companies
exporting at least 80% of their production were no longer subject to any equity
requirements.  Compimi  exportng between 50% and 79% of their production
wne penittod to bold 100%  equity,  provided  that they had invested USS50
million  or more  in fixed assets or competd  project  with  at klst 50%  local
value  added,  and  that  the  companys  products did  not  compete  with  those
produced  by  donestic  firs. These  guidelines  did  not  aply to  tors  in
which limits  on foreign  equity participadoo  had been  established.  In August
1993.  the  minimum  anoust  of equity that  had  to be  held  by  an  indignous
Malay group, company, or institution was lowered  from 51%  to 35%. In 1998,
invstom  od not directy  convert  their sbortam  mv  ent into  foreign
exchange.  Proceeds  from investmnts  bdd for  less than  one  yer could  be
transfred only  to  Malysian ringit-denominated aces  which  could be
used  only  to  acquire  othe  ringgit aseu.  In Febniuy  1999  the  mininmum
bolding  perod  was  eliminated  and  a  graduated  aystem  of exit  taxes  was
introduced. for invesments mnde prior to Febtuaty 1999,  capital  was taxed at
50% if repsariaed  kss than  men  months after entry, 20% if repatriated  afte
sevenmas, and  d10% ifrepatited nine  to  twelve months after entry capital
repatriated  after  a  yenr  and  the  orginal  cpitsl  of rnveshneim  made  afte
Febnury  wer  not  taxed.  Howev  repatriated  gains  for  te  invstients
wee  utxable as folowl  r  capital  gins repariated  within twelve  months after
the  gain was  realized wee  taxable  at 30%,  and  those  repatriaed  after more
fthn twelve msoriths  were taxable  at 109.
n 1973.  pivate crporations and  pnvate baWmn  were allowed to borrow aboad buI  n 1974. authmrties allowed  banks to isaue  certificate of deposits  at firen  l  1989,  restictons  on  fo  apitl  ptipatio  were  ubstantally
subjeet  to  the  appoval  of the  central  bank  Thee was no  special exchnge  rafintest rate  In August  1979,  a new system  to inrease flexibility  on  liberalized.  Foreign investments  wer  penontted in the Mexican  Stock Mariet
reime  for cpital  accm  trcis.  In August  1982. cornercial banh wk  deposit  interest rtes  was intoduced. By then  the  aximtm rates w  dnh  specially  dsigned  tst  fiamds  and  'B  shres  of  Mexican
rired to swrender to the Bank of Mexico tteir oet  foreign echange  holdings  frequenty  adjusted  by  the  central  bak  In  Septmber  1982,  cote  oratios  However, participation  was not allowed in the adminisadon of
tinchding  gold and silver.  In  Sepuember, an exchange control was intoduod with  Mexican  president  atdionalized  the banking sym  In October  1988.  the companies involved.  Foreign  investors  could  hold  mjoity of shres  in
prefeental  exchange  rae to be used  to make imeratt paymens  on foreign  credt  some  intecst  rate  conrols  were  lified.  and  libealizaton  of deposi  new  finn  as long  as  the new invstment  met a hst of condions.  In  1991.
In  Novenber  1991,  the  special  exchange  rate  regune  for  capital  acm  anteret  rates surted  In  April  1989,  interest  rte ceilinp  were  abolished  strictions  on  repatriation  of  capital  and  income  were  abolished  and
was abolished,  and the central  bank abolished the  restricton  on  Bank  s wen  authorized to pay inteest on checking accounts  reicin  on portfoio investment  wne  lifted  Howevr  thde  wre  ectom
IOnS  obtained  frotm  foreign  financial  instidons  to  be chamneled  through  diethat  remained resewrved  to  Mexicans  or to Mexicm corpoons with  a foreign
tolledexchamgemai,L  exchasion  dause.  Ther  wee  lo  ca  to  foreign  participaion  m  ome
scr  and foreign  invesment in othems  requrd prior  authorizat-'[-~  YA~-oItiAZ  ;1.'  :,  '  . 1  - -'-  .-- '  ,  '  ePl.zuhr  ,,  e  ,  . -.  ;-'rs -,:  . --.  e  :
Il  1980,  foreign  borrowing bt  bankh  as libeaiLzed  Imits oan  foren a  scy  In  1979.  lending rrne  regulitons  were  bnewly  rmaoved  end  explici  In  1971,  ;cqnsilon  b4  forign  investors  was precldd  RepIanation  of
expose ofbanks wor  established  In 1981, there was an  eimintion ofrmin  resrictions on  deposit  interes  rames  were  bfted.  In  Sqepnber  1985,  capital  and  inoome  was  free  of relations.  In 1989,  fuehr  liberalization
liniit  on nataoity of foreign  debt bed  by domeseic  firns. In  19S2, an upper limh  auihorities  switched  to  -called  interes  rate  mnitoring  (i.e.  tipulated  that  non-resident  portfolio  investment  in  Norwegian  shares  and
on  hrttea  borrowing abod by domestic  enterprises  was set Demglation o  suasion)  and  lending  ilteresi  razes  were  further  liberalized.  Also,  domsie listed bonds with a  naarity of one year or mre was unmutrictei In
the  conditions  on  bornuwmg  abroad  by corporations  started  in  1985  and  waslending intrest  rate declarations  were removed.  In  1988,  liberalizatio  1984. noresidens  were  allowed  to purchase  quoted and  nnnquoted  thrm
completed  in  1988.  In  1992,  borrowiig  and  klening  abroad wre  subject  to  of lending mtes was conpletd ad  dty  becamne  mkat deomined.  witbin  the  linis estoablished  in the  Concasion  Acts.  Previously,  most
rnudamy deposit  requrencent.  No  other  restrictions  on  borrowing and  lentrannswcons  in  s  ies  inolving  nonuresiden  tntert  were  sulbjet  to
ahrod existed.  Norwe  nn  compaies were peamined  to make  direct in  r4v.
a  broad.
In  1973,  a  special  excange mte regime  for capital  aseomi  tmnsactimo  existed.  In 1973,  thre wore  no intrest  rate  ceiings  for  deposit  and  endin  In  1991.  repatiation  of capital,  ncomc, and  dividends  were  liberalized.  In
Borrowing  abroad by capoaitns  was pemiued  bua  under  sonc resicticasI  rates.  but  somne refereial  lendng  mtes  existed.  In  1982  bindin  1992,  wnder  the Privte  Scor Guuantee  Reime,  forign  in  were
1974. the oaural bank elmiated the reglation restricting the net fopren  exr  inerest  amte  ceilings  were  put  in place.  In  1991.  conaOl  on  gua  Snteed non-discritni7story trstmenL The stock tmkt was IQO%  opened
position of commercial b2anks  In  1987. contols  ware imposed,  commenial  ban  hb et rates  were  abolished. In March  1992  intees  rates for foirign  eept for banks,  which  had a  foreign portfolio  inveatent linit of 15%  of
wer  nationalized,  and  borowing abroad  by hanks  was  substantially limited  exchange deposits were freed.  total  shars outstanding- In  1993,  shas  of banks  irce  comparnis, and
cash deposit  requiement  was  re-imposed.  In Deomber  1990, resrietons  wem  pension find nanment companies become  freely available.
relaxed,  apital  controls wee mnoved,  and  the  special exchange  rtoe  regim  fo
capital  torn t  tsctions  was  abolished.  In  1991.  borrowing  abroad
substantially  deregulated,  ad in  1992,  restictis  on  bornwing  abroad
N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In  1976.  the centrl  bank exempted  Offatmre  Banking Units (OBU.  introduced  int  1981,  the  central  hank  deregulated  all lnding  nd  deposit rats, In May 1986  a  ctty  fud ('rhe  Thornt  Philippins Rdevelopn  nt Fend
1972)  from  resirve  reurements,  local  axes,  and  fees  mid  paeinod  them  to  except  shor-teem  lending  rates  In July, ceings on all  deposit  Limited)  was  introduced.  In  1991,  a  new  foreign  irvestment  law  was
extend forign  ciarency loas to any enteprise  from  deposits ried  ostside  were  lifted and  in October,  the  ceilingm  on  medium  and  long  promulgted.  It  expanded  the  number  of  sectors  opened  to  full  foreign
counsay.  In 1979,  regulaons  were  introduced  to  gain  cont  over  lvd  er  n  dng rates  were  also lifted.  In December  1982.  the ceiling  on shert  owneship,  simplified  the  approval  process,  and  defined  more  cary
borrowing  from OBUs.  In 1983,  foreign  bosarwing  required pror appoval f  term lending  ates was eliminated.  rerions on foreign invmnt  However, the Irw required that Philippines
the  centa bank.  In  1994.  cornrcial  banks  wer  allowed  to  moain  opm  nationals owned a nmnanann  of 60% of the shares  issued by donestic  finra
exchange positions, bt subject to the lirnitatio,  that long and thort positonsO  To eue compliance,  Philippine  companies  typicaly  ised two class  of
notexceed 25% and 5%  respwetively, of uninpaired capital,  stock  (A-shares,  to be held  by  PhilippiDe  nationls, and B-shores,  which both
foreign and national  investo  could  buy)  Foreign  investors wae  allowed to
invest in all sects, except for those spcified in a negative  lis  Also, full sad
imnaoliate repatrin  privileges  for all  pes of inestm  we  allowed to
be serviced  directly,  without  the approval  of the  cesoal  bank.  Foreign
investmrnt regulations  were  removed over the following three  yems and moe
seco  of the econmay became  mon to 100% foreign ownership
In 1992,  all restrictos  on bonowing abroad by banks were  hminted, exct fo  In  1984U  the Bank of Portsgad  freed deposit  rates to align them a  In 1973,  the transfer abroad of full  proceeds  from  the liquidation  of foign
open foreign  exchange positon  maits.  In Augst, the Bank of Portuga  hl  mIsz  the rate on 6-12 m  t  me  deosi  which was suposed to serve  as  invesmet  was  authoized  without  retrictions.  Foreign  investments  wer
the ptrchase  of foreign securities  by resident  In Septembr, complsory depo  refence  ra  Howver,  ceilingp  an lent  and  on  some  dqsi  authorized  freely if they were involved  in ecvies that woe  of recognized
affecting  all  foreign  bovwm  were  abolished.  In  Decmber,  athoritie  fadl  interest  rstts  prevailed.  Some  preferntil  endIng  rates we  ill  intestfor P  grs deveoPm  t, and provided that no spazive opation
liberadized  all  extanl  bonowings  by resids  rgad  of their  natre  place.  In  1990  preferntial lending  rates  were practicaly  phasod  cont  in rea state  was involved.  In  1976, the  usnsf  abroad  of proceeds from  the
-mtity.  bta some  coilip reained.  liquidatior  of foreign  inestatineit  was urne  d aftcr fia  yeas  and  subject
to quantity restrictions  A new decret  law restricting forgn investment  wa
isted.  AU  private cpal u  actim  betwn  POugDa  and fiseign  coumtiea
were  subje  to  prior  distrization  by  the centa_  bak  Fori  die
inveswion  in Portuga  was  allwed on  the  basis  of the  Foreign  Investmtent
Code.  in 1986,  a new foreignp  vsmn  rgulaftion  substantially  librliHzed
capta  account osWanncta.  The  tmdraa  of the  proceeds of liquidation of
foresamv  t  in  cludingcapita  gains, was  free of restrictions.In  1975.  reguLar.ons  on  cap.Ll  mnfloss  cere  relaxed  In  swmraI  cases,  torroing  In  1974,  a gradual  hberalLzanti  or iarresi  roles  begn  suanmg aihthe Sime  193  foreign capital  pamcipation  %as penmaned  freelv  in mo,t Spairsh nabnad  by the  nonbank private  sector was  encouraged.  In 1977,  rules  on Spani  lib  eralization  of lending  rates on long-tenn  loans and on deposits  with  industries.  In  sorne  specific  industries,  foreign  patitsipanton  was  penritted direct inveset  abrad were  liberalized,  no  longer requiting  prior authorizadon.  aturity  over two yeamr In  1977, asthorities  beraliized interest  mtes an  freely tup  to 501%  of the capital  of the enterprise  and  arnooaits  excess of 50% In  addition,  authorized  banks  could  extend  crdit  in  foreign  currency  deposits  with  maturity over  one  year.  By  the beginning  of 1981,  lkndin  rquired  the  authorization  of  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Pschass  by nonresidents.  provided  that  it was  finanoed  with  funds deposited  in noirresident  and deposit interest  rates wer  freed, except  for sme  short-term drposi  nonresidents of shares  of Spanish  companies  were  fTeely  pernuioed  op to the convertible  currency  accounts.  A  non-interest  bearing  deposit  requin  rates.  In  1987,  final  liberalization  of  interest  rates  took  place  and  percentages  applicabte  to  direct  investment.  Nonresidents  could  freely equivalent  to 25%  of non-comuerial  loans and  credit  received from  abroad ws  authorities also allowed banks  to pay interest  for sight deposits.  repatriate the  proceeds,  including capital  gains, from  the liqidation of shares introduced  in  1979  and  abolished in  November  1980.  ALso in  November  1980.  in  Spanish  companies.  Holders  of  Spanish  securities  (excluding  securities foreign borrowing  by residents was liberalized:  autdwrization  became  automtnic  fo  issued by private  comnpanies  acqtuird throuagh  direct subscription) could  freely loans  with  naturity of at least one  year. In  1985.  for loans with natLrity of at le  transfer  abroad  interest  and  profits. The  securities  had to  be purchased  with one year,  authorization  becanc  autonatic  if the  application  was  not questioned  o  pesetas resulting from  the sale of foreign  exchane.  In  1986,  a new legislation rejected  within  fifteen  working  days  by  the  Bank  of Spain.  In  June  1988,  th  that farther  liberalized  foreign (direct and portfolio) investment  was approved. esinintum  maturity  period  of foreign  currency  borowing  not  subject  to  official  In  1992,  ost  mremaining  controls  on  capital  tansfer  were  abolished. Th authorization was raised  from one to three  years  In  1989, a 30%  unremunerated  proceeds from liquidation of  non-resident invesunenas and  capital could be deposit  requirement  on all  new foreign  borrowing  by induaa  finns was imposedL  freely  transferable  abod,  provided  that  these  investmetts  had  been  fully In  1990,  the unremunerated  deposit requirenment  on all foreign  boerowing by bank  registered at the Registry of Foreign Investnent. and  residents  was abolished.  In  1992, all renaining capital  controts were  lifted.
March,  the  non-remunerated  deposit  requirement  that  applied  to  all  loan
contracted  abroad  was abolished. In  ApriL  banks were authorized to grant financial
loans  to  noresidents  without  restrictions.  Between  September  and November.
foreign echange controls were  in place.  Conrptdsory  l-year non-interest bearing
deposits  at the Bank of Spain were required. Tbose deposits  were equal to  I  00%  of
(i) the increase  in the  pesers value  of the  total  long positions  in  foreign curency;
(ii)  the increase  in  credit  balances  relating  to  peseta-denominated  loans or deposi
transactions  visai-vis nonrceidents, except  those arising from exporting  financing.
In  1984.  Sweden  relaxed  the sniitomum  required maturity  for borrowing  abroad in  In  1978,  ceilings  on  banks'  deposit  interest  rates  were  abolished.  In  In 1973,  foreign direct investment and the transfer abroad of proceeds  required foreign currency  by enterpsises  from five to two years. In March  1987,  the limit on 1980,  controls  on lending  rates  for insuance companies  were  removed,  authorizaion,  which was always given.  Since 1980,  foreigners  were allowed foreign  bonowing by  enterprises  was  abolished.  In  1989,  the  rmaining  foreip| but lintits on aveage  lending rates  were imposed.  In  1985.  ceilings on  to  buy  Swedisb  shares.  In  1992, the act restricting  foreign  acquisitions  of exchange  controls  were  removed.  Corporations  were  free to  borrow  abroad banks' lending  mtes were lifted.  Swedish enterprises  was abolished. inrspective of the purpose and  maiturity.
In  July  1987. foreign  exchange  controls  were liberalized  and foreign  cxhmg  In September  1984.  the  central  bank allowed  banks  to  set their  prime In May 1983.  portfolio investment  by foreign  investors  was  poetitted through market  was  opened.  Exchange  controls  on  cunrent  account trensactions  we  rate based  on their cost of fiuds.  In  1986f  the central bank  approved  the purchase  of beneficiaty  certificates issued  by a  securids investment trust completely  abolishecL  and controls on capital  acowunt  transactions  were  linited  proposal  from the Bankdes association to enlarge  the range  between  the fund  enterprise within the country and sold by agent  outside the cotinty. A transactions  over  US$5  million  per  year  per  person.  Ceilings  of banks'  foreip  maximam and  minimunm  lending  rtes, allowing  banks  to enjoy a  grtea  preapproval  procedure  was required  for issuing beneficiary certificates.  Also liabilities were gradually  ised during the late 198s and 1990  In October  1996,  latitude in setting teir own lending rtes according to  loan maturity and  in  May  1983. the  first  country  fimd  was established.  In  December  1986, domestic  corporations  were allowed  wo freely  borrow  from  ovemeas  financial  custnres  credit  worthiness  In  July  1989, interest  rate ceilings  an  regulations  were relaxed,  and foreigners  were pemitted  to  invest  in stock institutions  and  convert  the  foreign  cunrency  finds  to  New  Taiwan  dollars.  fioams  were completel  abolishecL  In November  1994,  in order  to frthe  manrkets  via  contacts  with  mutual  funds.  In  1987,  ourtward  remittance  of December.  emanig resctions on forward foreign exchange trade  were  removed  liberalize  the  deposit-tang  business,  banks  were  allowed  to  post  capital were  allowed freely up to USS5  mnilion per year.  In February  1995,  the In  1997,  capital  acotuno  transactions  for  investment  or  trade purposes  we  interest  rtes  specified  for deposits  in excess of 3 millions  of New  ceilings on the  total  amount  of foreign  investment  in the  local stock market completely  free,  but  controls  remained  on  capital  trnusactions  of a short-n  Taiwan  dollars  and these  rtes  could differ from  those  on deposits o  were abolished. The  new regulation  equired that each  fonrign investor held no nature.  The  amount  that  companies could frely inwardly or outwardly remit  eac  less  than 3 millions of New Taiwan  dollars  even  thtough  the  letgth o  more  that 6%  of the market  capitalization  of a listed company,  and  foreign year  was  raned  fiom  US$20  million  to US$50  million.  in May,  restrictions o  maturity cud  be  the sme.  investors as a goutp could not bold mre than  12%  ofthe markecapitalization foreign liabilty limits of autwdorized  foreign exchange banks  were  abolished.  ofa listed company.  In August, the atios were  increased to  7.5%  and 15%Arespectively.  Foreign  direct  investment  by  all  foreign  natural  persoas  was
pemitted  In March  1996, the domestic  secties  nmarket  was  fuather opened
to nonresidents.  Each  offshore  natual  person  and  offshore  juridical  permon
could  invest  up  to  USS5  million  and  USS20  million  in  the  market
rspectively.  The  ceiling  on  total  foeign  direct  investment  in  any  listed
corportion  was  raised  in  March  and  November  to  15% of the  oustanding
shamrs.  In  December  1996,  the ceilings  on investments  in  the stock market by
qualified  foregin  institnional  investors was  raised  from  US$400  millions  to
US$600  millions.  In  February  1997,  domestic  companies  were  allowed  to
issue stocks overseas, and  foeign  companis  were allowed to list their stocks
in the domestic market  In JIaury 1998,  ceilings on the proportions of a local
companies  listed  share  that could  be  held by  an  individual  foeign investor
and  by  foreign  investors  as a  group  were  raised  to  2594,  and  30%.
rspectively.  In April.  the ratio was increased to 50%.
I  n October.  Thailand exemnpted  all loans  with original  manttity of more  than on  In June  1989, the  Bank of Thailand  decided to eliminate  the ceiling  fo  In 1988, repatriation of income and capital  could be  made freely. In Januaiy, a
year  frorn  the 10%  tmandatory  deposit  requirentan  In  1982,  authorities  set  the  time  deposits  with  inaurity  of more  than  one  year.  In  March  1990,  country  fund  ('The  Siam  Fund  Limited")  was  introduced.  In  1990. equity
maximmn  mte  that  forignlenders  could charge  toThai cosnera in  confornity  interest  rate  ceilings  on  all  types  of  deposits  were  eliminated  capital  investmnents  by  nonresidents  could  be  made  freely.  Foreign  equity
the domestic interest rate ceiling, which  enabled bornwers to legally borrow  irom  In June  1992,  lending interet rates  were liberalized.  participation  or joint  venture  were  freely  perintted.  Forein  investors could
abroad at rates  higher than the ceiling  mate  stipulated in the Civi  and Conmeerial  hod  up to 100%A  of  the equity of a firm,  hat provided that the firm exported  all
. Code.  A  special  exchange  rate  regime  for  current  account  transactions  was  of its output  Certain  economic activities  were still reserved to Thai nationals.
intrduced  in  1983  and  abolished  in  19S4.  In  1992,  loans  from abroad  could be  The  Banking Law  restricted  foreign owneship  in banks to  25%.  The  Alien
contracted  without  restrictions,  but if  the  loan  was  used  domestically,  residen  Business  Law  restricted  foreign  ownership  in  specfied  sectors to  49%.  In
borrowers were required  to convert foreign currency  obtained into bahts. In  Augus  addition,  other  laws  provided  similar  restrictions  that  ranged  from  15%  to
1995,  asymmetric  open position  limits for  short and long  positions were in rduced  65%.
in  order  to  discourage  foreign  borrowing.  In  December,  a variety  of meacsu
aimed  at reducing foreign-financed  lending  was introduced.  In  1996,  the remaining
restrictions  on credit  to rsidents  from  nonresidents  were  elininated.  In  May  and
June  1997,  the central bank adopted  some  measures to limet capital  flOws  A two-
tier  exchange  rate  regime  was inroduced  in  July 1997  and  abandoned  in Januar
1998.
in October  1973,  the  minimum period  for  foreign  currency  borrowing  for  most Since the early  1980s, authorities in dte United  Kingdom abandoned  the  In  1973,  nnresidents  could  buy  sterling  securities  on  a  recognized  stock
domestic uses was redutced to two years.  In  1979, the  special exchange mte regime  use of credit  controls  In  August  1981,  the  Bank  of England  stopp  exchange  in  the  United  Kingdom  against  paymme in  foreign  currency  or in
. for capital  eccount  transactions  was abolished.  In October,  authorities  elminated  publishing  its  minimum  lending  mte  and  eliminated  the  ceilings  on  sterling from an extemal  account  The securities  purchased  could be exported.
51  all harriers to outward and inward  flows of capital.  deposits  mtes.  However,  some  contmils  on the  mortgage  lending  rate  The  participation  of foreign  capital  as  a  direct  investment  was  subject  to
were  still in  piece.  In  1986,  ceilings  on lending  rates  were  eliminated,  individual  authorization,  which  was  normally  granted.  Cases  involving  the
and the government  withdrew its gWudance  on nortgage  ledingr  mtes.  takeover of cxisting  companis,  which  by their  size or  natre,  constituted a
vital  pat  of  the  English  economy  were  considered  on  their  merits.  All
. proceeos  fromn  realization,  redemption,  or  maturity  of  serlding  capital  assets
(including  direct  investments)  owned  by  nonrasidents  could  be  fredy
raDnsferred  asroad  at the  official  exchange  rate.  Payments  for  invisibles to
nonresidents  required  exchange  control  authoriztion,  which  was  grnted
freely.
In  1973, corporations  were  allowed to borrow  abroad but subject to ceilings, which  In  1973, Rceulation Q  that st ceilings on interest  payments on  deposits  In  1973,  capital,  income,  end profits  were  freely  trnsferable abroad.  Ther
were relaxed  in  July.  In June,  the minimum reserve to bh held by  Fedeml Resieve  was in  plEce.  In  19g2,  Regulation Q  was suspended.  By October  1983,  were  no  restrictions  on  foreign  portfolio  and  direct  investurrnt  Forei
manibr brtts aSainst Euro-dollar borrowings  in excess of amm&ts permitted  as  a  all contols on  time deposits  with an  original ns&urity of at  least  thirty  portfolio  investment  in  excess  of  10%/.  of dte  voting  securities  of a  US
rerve-free  base,  inntrduced  in  1972,  w2S reduced  from 20% to  9I/.. It  was  fute  two days  were lifted.  corporation  was  considered  direct  investment  and  had  to b  repoted to the
reduced  in A,mil 1975, from S% to 4°, and in December  1977,  from 4% to 1%.  In  Departmrnt  of Ccnamarce.  Portfolio  investnent  by  nanresidents  had  to bz
August  1978, the reserve  requirement on loans by foreign bmnrchs of US banks  to  reported to thz Treasury Depatnment.
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